Trident and the alternatives: The future of the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent by Sheehan, Anthony T.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
April 21 1989
THIS IS TO CERTIFY T H A T  T H E  THESIS PREPARED U N D E R  M Y  SUPERVISION BY
............A nth o n x..i\ . Shco h a n................................................
ENTITLED... 9.!*...?-^ G. A1 tomtitivcs: The Future of the United
.................................................... ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
IS A P PROVED BY M E  AS FULFILLING THIS PART O F  T H E  REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E  
DEGREE OF. Bachelor of_ Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences
0>I364
Trident and the Alternatives!
The Future of the United Kingdom's Independent Nuclear Deterrent
By
Anthony T. Sheehan
Thesis
for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts 
in
Liberal Arts and Sciences
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences 
University of Illinois 
Urbana, Illinois
1989
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION iii
CHAPTER ONE FROM 1939 TO TRIDENTt A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1
CHAPTER TWO WHY THERE SHOULD BE AN IND 18
CHAPTER THREE CRITERIA FOR THE IND AND TRIDENT 36
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES TO TRIDENT 48
CHAPTER FIVE ARMS CONTROL, PUBLIC OPINION, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 66
CONCLUSION 78
ENDNOTES 80
BIBLIOGRAPHY 96
ii
INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom has been involved with nuclear weapons since 
before 1940 and has been a nuclear power since the detonation of its 
first atomic bomb in 1952. It currently maintains an Independent 
Nuclear Deterrent (IND) of four submarines each equipped with sixteen 
Polaris A-3 ballistic missiles. This fleet will no longer be serviceable 
by the mid-1990*s, and plans are well underway to replace the Polaris 
boats with a new fleet of four Trident missile submarines. While there 
always has been and continues to be a public and to some extent a 
political consensus behind Britain retaining an IND, the high cost and 
extra capabilities of the Trident system have led to much controversy 
over its potential as a replacement for Polaris. This paper will examine 
various aspects of the Trident decision.
Chapter One reviews the history of the IND from its earliest days up 
to the Trident decision. The next chapter looks at the pros and cons of 
the IND itself and concludes that it is worth keeping if it can be 
afforded. Chapters Three and Four present the criteria for an effective 
IND and examine how several potential candidate systems measure-up to 
those criteria. While many of the systems are attractive, the Trident II 
appears to be the best choice to replace Polaris even though Trident is a 
more capable missile than Britain needs. Finally, Chapter Five concludes 
that the IND will not harm current or planned arms control negotiations. 
It ends with an examination of the public and political consensus behind 
the IND. While public support for the IND remains strong, its existence 
is threatened by the unilateral disarmament policies of Labour.
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CHAPTER ONE
FROM 1939 TO TRIDENT» A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In 1940, two German refugee scientists at Birmingham University, 
Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch, proved that a nuclear explosion was 
theoretically possible (1). This discovery revitalized British interest 
in atomic weapons (2). Further study of the scientists' work resulted in 
the 1941 Maud Report which agreed with their conclusions. Despite the 
fact that the United States had yet to enter World War II, the Maud 
Report was shared with the U.S., and in 1943 Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed at Quebec to combine their bomb 
building efforts. Several British scientists led by Dr. William Penney 
traveled to the U.S. to participate in the secret Manhattan Project which 
led to the first atomic bomb. In 1944, Churchill and Roosevelt Gilded 
at Hyde Park, New York, to extend nuclear cooperation beyond the War (3). 
That promise of cooperation was to be short lived. In 1946 Congress 
passed the Atomic Energy Act (the McMahon Act) forbidding U.S. nuclear 
collaboration with any other nation (4).
In secret, new Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee formed the 
Atomic Cabinet Committee in 1946. Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh 
Dalton and President of the Board of Trade Sir Stafford Cripps objected 
to the cost of building a British bomb (5). They were subsequently 
excluded from GEN 163 (6), the Cabinet committee that decided on January 
8, 1947 to proceed with a bomb building project. This decision was 
announced to Parliament over a year later on May 12, 1948. There was 
little controversy at that time (7).
Three factors explain the British decision to build an atomic bombs
1
2national pride, uncertainty over the future, and coat. The consensus on 
these three points lasted until the early 1980's.
Britain was one of the world's great powers before World War II. 
During the war, British power and influence declined relative to that of 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but the new balance of power was not 
immediately evident after the war. The U.K. still had commitments around 
the world and was a member with the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the "Big 
Three" victorious nations. The British economy was the strongest in 
Western Europe, and the extent of Soviet power was not yet known (8).
U.K. scientists had been among the pioneers in nuclear research, and they 
expected it to continue after the war (9). Labour Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin felt that Britain "could not afford to acquiesce in an 
American monopoly of this new development." (10). For a nation that 
viewed itself as still a major player in world events, there was nothing 
unusual about the decision to build an atomic bomb. In fact, it just 
seemed like the natural thing to do (11). A more vivid illustration of 
the national pride element of the nuclear decision was Bevin's 
declaration in the 1946 Atomic Cabinet Committee, "We've got to have this 
thing over here whatever it costs. We've got to have a bloody Union Jack 
on top of it." (12).
Another dimension of national pride involved a British desire to 
contribute to and to influence the Western defensive effort. During the 
war, there was close consultation between the U.S. and Britain. This 
cooperation ended soon after with U.S. moves like the McMahon Act. Many 
in Britain felt that nuclear weapons were necessary to restore U.S. 
respect for the U.K. and, with that respect, the former, close
3relationship (13).
Right after the war, it was assumed that the U.S. would not have 
enough atonic weapons to cover all of the desired targets in the Soviet 
Union. A British nuclear force was thought necessary to ensure that all 
high priority areas were targeted. By the 1950's, however, the earlier, 
theorized difficulties of building a sizeable nuclear arsenal proved 
false. The U.S. had a sufficient supply of bombs. The British emphasis 
was then shifted to cover targets to which the U.S. would assign a low 
priority but which were important to Britain. Medium range Soviet 
nuclear systems would be on this list. In any case, the British still 
saw their weapons as valuable contribution to Western defense (14).
Uncertainty over tho future was the second reason for the British 
bomb. First, the eventual number of nuclear powers was not yet known.
It seemed sensible for the British to join the nuclear club early, 
especially when it retained commitments to defend a large part of the 
Commonwealth (15). Second, it was also unknown what role the U.S. would 
play in the post-war world. Many in the British Government felt betrayed 
by the McMahon Act and its ending of nuclear exchanges. The U.S. also 
halted lend-lease and other wartime cooperative policies. These steps 
pointed to a possible U.S. return to isolationism and served as a warning 
that the U.K. could not totally rely on the United States. The British 
wero alone from the end of the war until the U.S. again intervened with 
NATO and the Marshall Plan, and they did not feel secure. Prime Minister 
Attlee believed nuclear weapons to be necessary to defend the U.K. under 
these circumstances. An independent British force was seen as an 
insurance policy against a U.S. retreat from Europe (16). Even today,
4many of the justifications for retention of the IND rest on uncertainty 
over American intentions.
Finally, British defense efforts were and continue to be limited by 
available economic resources. Britain has been fortunate in that it has 
been able to maintain its IND at a relatively low cost. The expense of 
the initial bomb project was manageable, especially since a sophisticated 
delivery system was not then needed (17). Even so, Prime Minister Attlee 
hid the L100 million cost (18) of the project from Parliament in the 
Civil Contingencies Fund under the heading "Public Buildings in Great 
Britain" (19). Other Prime Ministers would not have this luxury, and 
monetary considerations soon became very important in deciding which 
nuclear systems to Keep and which ones to cancel.
Dr. William Penney was picked to lead the initial development 
project which culminated on October 3, 1952 with the successful test of 
the first British bomb in the Monte Bello Islands off Australia (20). A 
few weeks later, the U.S. tested a hydrogen bomb (21). The Soviet Union 
did the same in August, 1953 (22). A new Conservative Government under 
Churchill decided in 1954 to produce a British hydrogen bomb. It was 
successfully tested on Christmas Island in the Pacific in 1957, four 
years after the Soviet device. Even at this relatively early period of 
the nuclear age it was becoming increasingly difficult for the British to 
keep up with the superpowers (23).
Fortunately, the U.S. was becoming more open to information sharing. 
The 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act allowed exchange of data on such external 
characteristics as the size, weight, shape, yield, and effects oi nuclear 
weapons. Information on the design and fabrication of nuclear components
5was still secret (24)* The Atomic Energy Act was amended in 1958 to 
allow exchanges of design and production details and of fissile material, 
if not completed bombs. These exchanges were limited to nations that had 
made ’substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons.” The 
U.K. was the only ally that met this criterion. By May, 1959, Britain 
was even allowed to purchase nuclear weapons components and to exchange 
plutonium for enriched uranium (25). The British viewed these agreements 
as a way to cut the costs and increase the speed of their nuclear 
programs (26).
The United States had its own reasons for increasing cooperation. 
First, Soviet military strength was growing. The U.S. was becoming 
increasingly dependent on the help of its allies to meet this threat.
For example, the U.S. needed basing sites in Britain for intermediate 
range missiles. America also wished to equip NATO forces with tactical 
nuclear weapons. Such moves required greater information sharing by the 
U.S. along with a willingness to address the desires of its allies in 
exchange for their support of U.S. programs. Second, President 
Eisenhower was more sympathetic to British concerns than Truman had been. 
He believed that faith and trust were vital to healthy alliance ties. 
Third, the British program was highly successful. U.K. scientists knew 
enough about nuclear weapons that there was little point in keeping 
secrets. In 3ome areas, the British were even ahead of the Americans. 
Finally, the Soviet nuclear program was also highly developed. Leaks to 
the Soviets would not be as damaging as they would have been in the past 
when the U.S. had a stronger lead (27).
Atomic bombs suitable for military operations were ready by 1956.
6Responsibility for delivering these weapons fell to the Royal Air Force 
Bomber Command’s fleet of V~bombers, the Valiants, Vulcans, and Victors. 
These planes entered service in the mid-1950's, replaced the Bomber 
Command's older planes by 1960, and remained the delivery vehicle for 
Britain's Independent Nuclear Deterrent (IND) until the late 1960's (28). 
It was during this same period, however, that Minister of Defence Duncan 
Sandys issued the 1957 Defence White Paper which contained the beginning 
of the end for the Bomber Command. Sandys believed that manned bombers 
would soon be obsolete. All plans for a manned replacement for the 
V-borabers were ended (29) in favor of a liquid fueled, intermediate 
range, ballistic missile known as Blue Streak. Blue Streak was in 
development for three years until it was cancelled in 1960. Its reaction 
time of ten minutes was judged too slow for survivability, and the cost 
of the needed improvements was considered too high (30).
The cancellation of Blue Streak was not thought to be a major 
problem since the Bomber Command had an air launched missile known as 
Blue Steel. It would remain effective against Soviet air defenses until 
the mid 1960's when the British planned to acquire Skybolt, an American 
air launched ballistic missile (31). Skybolt can be seen as the last 
step in the decline of total British nuclear independence. The V-bombers 
were all British. Blue Streak's guidance system and engine were based on 
an American design. Now all other British nuclear projects were 
cancelled in favor of Skybolt. In 1960, when the Skybolt purchase was 
arranged, the only thing that the British could offer in return was a 
base at Holy Loch for U.S. Polaris submarines (32).
The British loss of national nuclear independence was not made any
7easier by the new Kennedy Administration in the United States. Defense 
Secretary Robert McNamara especially desired American control over all 
Western nuclear forces in order to prevent a U.S. ally from starting a 
war that the U.S. did not want. In fact, in June, 1962, McNamara 
described small, independent, nuclear forces as "dangerous, expensive, 
prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent."
While this position was militarily sound from an American standpoint, it 
put the British in a difficult situation since the U.K. was becoming 
increasingly dependent on the U.S. for the weapons of the IND (33).
Further diplomatic harm was done when the U.S. decided, because of 
technical problems, to cancel Skybolt, the one weapon on which the 
British had based all of their plans for the next several years.
Freedman uses the word "horrified" to describe the British reaction to 
this move (34). A little over a month after the end of Skybolt, starting 
on December 19, 1962, Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and 
Preside i Kennedy met in Nassau where it was agreed that the British 
could purchase American Polaris submarine launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs) (35). While the agreement commits the British missiles to the 
defense of NATO, Macmillan inserted a clause allowing independent British 
use of the weapons "where Her Majesty's Government may decide that 
supreme national interests are at stake." (36). A more detailed purchase 
agreement was later negotiated in which the British would buy Polaris A-3 
missiles at cost plus five percent for research and development and build 
their own warheads and submarines (37).
Despite warnings that it would end the IND, the Labour Party under 
Harold Wilson won a Parliamentary majority in 1964 for the first time
8since 1951. The left wing of the party favored unilateral nuclear 
disarmament, but Wilson was able to quiet them by trimming an optional 
fifth Polaris submarine from the program (38). The reasons that Wilson's 
Government decided to keep the Polaris program can be seen in the three 
points that formed the consensus behind the 1946 project.
Despite the fact that France, Britain's traditional rival, now had 
its own nuclear weapons, the national pride element of the consensus 
declined considerably. Wilson was willing to cancel Polaris if it proved 
too expensive (39). The desire to contribute to Western security 
continued but merged with increasing uncertainty over the future. 
Horizontal proliferation was limited to France and the People's Republic 
of China. Neither of these nations posed a direct threat to Britain 
although there was some concern that China might use its nuclear weapons 
against India (40). Far more threatening to the U.K. itself was the 
vertica* proliferation of the superpowers. The Soviet Union was becoming 
increasingly able to threaten the U.S. putting the U.S. nuclear guarantee 
of Europe in doubt. Rather than seeing themselves as nuclear partners 
with the U.S., the British began to focus on their ability to provide 
Western Europe with some independent nuclear cover should the U.S. back 
out in a crisis (41). The U.K. may have had to buy their missiles from 
the U.S., but a British finger was still on the button.
Part of this move towards Europe comes from a British desire to join 
the European Economic Community. Britain's foreign policy had two 
incompatible goalst closer economic relations with Europe and strong 
military ties with the United States (42). For a time it was thought 
that the British nuclear force could provide the basis for a European
9deterrent and hopefully make it easier for the U.K. to join the E.E.C. 
(A3). Prime Minister Macmillan considered nuclear cooperation with 
France, but he decided that it would disrupt the more valuable 
Anglo-American relationship. In the end, the Nassau Agreement ended any 
chance of an early British admission to the E.E.C.. Britain*s allies, 
especially General de Gaulle of France, were upset that Britain had 
concluded such a major agreement tying itself to the U.S. without even 
consulting them (44).
Polaris was able to fill the IND niche. It was reliable and 
advanced enough to remain in service for a long time. It was an 
excellent second strike weapon, too inaccurate to threaten Soviet nuclear 
forces but sufficiently powerful to deliver a devastating countervalue 
retaliation (45). It was also inexpensive enough to satisfy Wilson's 
Labour Government. At the peak of its procurement period, Polaris would 
consume only five percent of the defense budget. Once operational, that 
percentage would drop to less than two (46). By the end of the 1960's 
the four Polaris submarines, Resolution, Repulse, Renown, and Revenge, 
had replaced the V-bombers as the vehicle for the IND. Since June, 1969 
there has always been at least one Polaris submarine on patrol, and 
Polaris will continue in service until the Trident SLBM system becomes 
operational in the middle of the next decade (47).
The Polaris A-3 missile has three warheads each with a 200 kiloton 
yield, but they are not independently targetable. Rather, they fall in a 
pattern around a target after being fired from a submarine up to 2,500 
nautical miles away (48). The original missile was, however, perceived 
to be vulnerable to advances in Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
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defenses. First, a submarine can only fire one missile at a time since 
the water rushing into the missile tube after a launch temporarily 
destabilizes the sub (49). Second, by the time the warheads separate 
from the missiles, the missiles are already vulnerable to Soviet 
defenses. Third, only one submarine is guaranteed to be on patrol at any 
time. It would not take a Star Wars system to stop sixteen missiles 
coming one at a time. The British situation was made even more difficult 
by the fact that the Soviets put the one ABM system that they were 
allowed under the ABM Treaty around Moscow. Moscow is the primary target 
for Polaris not only for its symbolic significance but also because it is 
the nerve center of the centralized Soviet state (50).
Almost from the beginning of the Polaris force, the British were 
worried that advances in ABM technology would render their IND useless.
In order to prevent this, they had two options represented by two 
American programs. The Polaris missiles could be replaced with the 
multiple, independently targetable, reentry vehicle (MIRV) missile called 
Poseidon which would overwhelm Soviet defenses with many targets (51). 
Alternately, the reentry vehicles of the non-MIRVed Polaris could be 
changed to enable them to penetrate Soviet defenses more effectively.
This corresponds to an American program known as Antelope I (52).
Poseidon was rejected for two main reasons both by the Wilson 
Government and again by a new Conservative Government under Edward Heath. 
First, there was little domestic support for acquiring expensive MIRVed 
missiles so soon after Polaris had entered service. Second, the U.K. was 
again trying to enter the E.E.C. under Wilson and was a new member under 
Heath. A large Poseidon purchase from the U.S. would have disrupted
11
Britain's relationship with the E.E.C. just as the Nassau Agreement had 
done earlier (53). Instead, an improved version of Antelope was put into 
further development under the code name Chevaline. At the time,
Chevaline was thought to be a less expensive option which would not 
require a divisive public debate. In fact, the program was not 
officially acknowledged until 1980 (54). Chevaline had been secretly 
started by a Labour Government and just as quietly endorsed by the 
appropriate people in the subsequent Conservative Government (55). 
Political survivability was also a strong factor in the final decision.
While the calculations on political survival were correct, the ones 
on cost were not. In 1974, Chevaline was estimated to cost L200 million 
compared to L500 million for Poseidon (56). Unfortunately, the technical 
complexity of Chevaline had been underestimated. By 1977, development 
costs had increased to L800 million. Also, the public was slowly 
becoming aware that a Polaris improvement program was underway. 
Cancellation by the Labour Government of the time would have sent a 
signal that the Labour Party was prepared to end the IND. Bather than 
waste the money already spent and spark an unwanted debate over the 
future of the IND, the Government decided to continue with Chevaline. By 
1980, Chevaline was ready to be put on the missiles of the Renown (57).
While the details are still secret, the system is known to use 
balloon decoys. The warheads are also in balloons so that they cannot be 
distinguished from the decoys (58). Other elements of Chevaline include 
"hardened" electronics to protect the missiles from the electromagnetic 
effects of nuclear explosions, and warheads that separate from their 
missile before it is within range of ABM defenses. Even though the
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missiles can still only be launched one at a time, the warheads can 
maneuver in space so that all arrive at the target at the same time (59). 
The final cost of Chevaline was over LI,000 million in 1980, or L530 
million in 1972 pounds (60). In the end, the expected improvements in 
Soviet ABM defenses did not materialize making the expense of Chevaline 
even more painful.
Another problem with the Polaris missile is that In time the solid 
propellant can pull away from its casing causing the missile to misfire. 
The American missiles were older than the British ones and were repaired 
sooner. By the time that the British decided to remotor their missiles 
in 1982, the American Polaris facilities had already been closed. The 
U.K. had to pay extra to reopen these facilities (61). The repair 
program cost the U.K. L300 million (62). With the new motors and the 
Chevaline reentry vehicles, Britain’s Polaris system should remain 
effective until the middle of the 1990’s. By then the submarines will be 
nearing the end of their life. They will be increasingly difficult and 
expensive to repair, and they will be too noisy to remain safe from more 
developed Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapons and tactics (63). 
Because of the long lead time needed to produce a replacement for 
Polaris, a decision had to be made by the early 1980*s.
The Labour Government of Prime Minister James Callaghan started to 
study the option of replacement in 1978. Callaghan set up a secret 
committee consisting of himself, Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis 
Healey, Foreign Secretary Dr. David Owen, and Defence Minister Fred 
Mulley. The committee asked a research group under Sir Ronald Mason of 
the Ministry of Defence to study the technical aspects of the various
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replacement systems. A similar group headed by Sir Michael Duff of the 
Foreign Office was charged with examining the wider policy aspects of 
replacing Polaris. The eventual Duff-Mason Report recommended the 
retention of the IND if it did not become prohibitively expensive. The 
technical recommendations leaned towards a new S1.BM system. Based on 
these conclusions, Callaghan began discussions with President Carter in 
1979 (64). The Labour Government realized, however, that any debate over 
the future of the IND was bound to become heated, and they wanted to 
postpone it as long as possible. The 1979 Labour Party Manifesto was 
worded to leave open the option of a replacement system while remaining 
vague enough not to stir up emotions (65).
Callaghan's Government was able to avoid the debate about a Polaris 
replacement. The Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher won in 1979.
Mrs. Thatcher set up her own Cabinet committee called MISC7. It was 
composed of herself, Lord Carrington, Sir Geoffrey Howe, William 
Whitelaw, and Francis Pym, the ministers in charge of foreign, exchequer, 
home, and defence affairs respectively (66). By July, 1980, a decision 
had been reached to purchase the U.S. Trident I (C-4) missile (67). In 
1982, the program was upgraded with more advanced Trident II (D-5) 
missiles after President Reagan accelerated the U.S. D-5 program (68). A 
better propulsion system, the pressurized water reactor 2 (PWR2), and the 
latest sonar were also included in the upgrade (69).
Both the C-4 and the D-5 agreements are similar to the original 
Polaris sales agreement. The U.K. will buy the missiles complete with 
their MIRVs but will supply its own warheads and submarines. The British 
forces will be assigned to NATO "except where the United Kingdom
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Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake."
(70). The U.K. was to pay a five percent surcharge on the C-4's, the 
same as with Polaris (71), while the research and development charge for 
D-5 was limited to $116 million fiscal year 1982 dollars. The D-5 
agreement also includes provisions for U.K. firms to bid for subcontracts 
on the same terms as U.S. firms (72). The letters exchanged between 
Prime Minister Thatcher and Presidents Carter and Reagan and between 
their respective defense secretaries contain none of the earlier hostile 
attitudes of the U.S. towards the IND during the Kennedy years. In fact, 
President Reagan speaks of "the groat importance which the United States 
Government attach to the maintenance by the United Kingdom of an 
(IND)..." (73).
The Trident decision generated considerable military and political 
controversy based to a large extent on the great cost and destructive 
capabilities of the D-5 missile. Many who wished to retain the IND in 
principle argued that cheaper, albeit less effective, systems were 
sufficient to satisfy Britain's needs. These issues will all be 
considered in later chapters. The remainder of this chapter will be 
devoted to the technical and financial details of the Trident II system 
along with information on the progress of the program.
The D-5 is a highly accurate missile capable of destroying Soviet 
missiles in hardened silos (74). It has a range of 4,000 nautical miles 
with a full load of fourteen MIRVed warheads. The range increases to 
6,000 nautical miles when only eight warheads are carried (75). The 
British plan to build a four submarine force. Each boat will be able to 
go for seven years between refits allowing more than one (and up to
15
three) submarines to be operational for a good portion of the time (76). 
In comparison, Polaris boats need a refit every 3% years (77). Each 
submarine will be fitted with sixteen missile tubes. While the actual 
number of missiles and warheads remains secret, the D-5 system will not 
have more warheads than earlier planned for the C-4 system which allowed 
a maximum of 123 per submarine (78). The most likely configuration is 
sixteen missiles per submarine, each topped with eight, one hundred 
kiloton warheads (79). While Britain will retain operational control 
over the missiles in its submarines, those missiles will be taken from a 
common pool at the U.S. base in King's Bay, Georgia. The U.K. has rights 
to a full complement of sixteen missiles for each boat, but it does not 
have rights to any specific missile or set thereof (80).
The original capital cost estimate for the C-4 purchase was L5,000 
million. The switch to D-5 missiles added L390 million to this figure. 
These missiles require a larger submarine than the C-4's. However, the 
cost of the larger boats is hidden by combining it with the cost of other 
submarine improvements. The total for enlarging and improving the 
submarines comes to L500 million. It should be noted that these 
improvements will result in longer periods between refits which should 
lead to lower operating costs for this configuration (81). In then 
current prices, the March, 1982 estimate of Trident's capital cost was 
L7,520 million (82). A 1982 decision to use the U.S. King's Bay facility 
cut L770 million from the projected cost producing a February, 1983 
estimate of L6,984 million. The most recent figure, January, 1988, is 
L9,043 million capital expenditure covering the period 1980-2000 (83).
In constant 1987-1988 prices this represents a savini of LI.807 million
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compared to the 1982 estimate. This saving comes from more accurate cost 
estimates, the moving of some work to Britain, and a more favorable 
exchange race than existed in the middle of the decade.
Of the L9,063 million, 66% will be spent in the V.K., an improvement 
from the 56% of 1981 (86). So far, fifty-nine British firms have 
received 337 subcontracts valued at $85 million, only two percent of the 
amount that the U.K, will spend on Trident in the United States.
However, the Thatcher Government believes that the follow-on orders will 
be better (85). Breaking the program down into its components, as of 
January, 1988, 33% of the cost goes for submarines, 12% for missiles, 12% 
for missile related equipment, 8% for the tactical weapons system, 7% for 
shore construction, and 29% for warheads and miscellaneous (86).
The first Trident submarine, HMS Vanguard is due to enter service in 
1996. The second submarine, Victorious, will be ready t»oon thereafter 
(87) with the Vengeance and the Venerable coming later (88). According 
to the Ministry of Defence, the Trident program is progressing 
satisfactorily (89). What they do not say is that there have been 
problems with the manufacturing program for the Trident warhead. In 
1978, the Pochin Report warned that radiation levels at the atomic weapons 
facility at Aldermaston were too high. In 1980, a decision was made to 
replace the old A65 warhead construction facility with a more modern, 
safer one, the A90, to be ready by 1986. The decision to acquire the D-5 
missile mandated increased production facilities and pushed A90’s 
completion date back to 1988. Skilled manpower shortages are for the 
most part responsible for a further two year delay (90).
There is some controversy as to the effect that this delay will have
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on the Trident program. The Defence Committee believes that the A45 
facility, with enough lead time, will be able to produce a sufficient 
number of warheads to meet the requirements for the Vanguard (91).
Urban, however, assuming one hundred warheads per submarine based on 
estimates of one hundred anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow by the 
mid-1990*s, expresses doubts that the Vanguard will be able to enter 
service with a full complement of warheads (92). There is no dispute 
that it will be difficult to meet the targets for the other three boats.
The historical outline presented should provide a useful backdrop as 
attention is now turned to a more detailed consideration of other aspects 
of the Trident program and the IND.
CHAPTER TWO
WHY THERE SHOULD BE AH IND
The most fundamental question about the IND is whether it should 
exist at all. Does it enhance or diminish British security? There are 
various arguments both for and against it, and the purpose of this 
chapter is to examine them subject to some limitations. First, while 
moral issues are extremely important in the debate over nuclear weapons 
in general, there is enough material on this subject to warrant a 
separate senior thesis. The following discussion is, out of necessity, 
restricted to the military and strategic aspects of the IND. Second, the 
arguments advanced are about the IND in general, not about any specific 
system. Trident and some of the more viable alternatives will be 
evaluated on their own merits later.
Geography is a very influential factor in the relationship between 
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and among the nations of 
the two alliances. The WTO is unified geographically. There is no 
question that the Soviet Union will vigorously resist any move against a 
WTO ally because its own territory would soon be threatened. The U.S., 
however, is an ocean away from most of the rest of NATO and for the most 
part invulnerable to anything but a nuclear attack. Another element to 
consider is that the WTO has large quantitative advantages over NATO in 
many categories of conventional arms. This is to some extent offset by 
the higher quality of NATO weapons. However, there is still debate as to 
whether or not NATO could stop a Soviet conventional attack without 
having to use nuclear weapons (1). That is the dilemma. Would the U.S. 
be willing to go nuclear to defend Western Europe or would it retreat
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across the Atlantic so as to avoid a Soviet reprisal against U.S. cities?
There are also financial and political elements to NATO. The U.S. 
pays sixty percent of NATO's costa and provides forty-two percent of its 
forces (2). The U.S. is faced with a large federal budget deficit and 
the largest national debt in the world. Western Europe has long since 
recovered from the devastation of World War II and has a combined gross 
"national” product similar to that of the United States. Economic 
competition between the two sides of the Atlantic is strong. Also, the 
European allies frequently do not agree with U.S. foreign policy goals. 
The ongoing dispute over the Libyan pharmaceutical/chemical weapons plant 
is an example. These factors could lead to cuts in the U.S. NATO 
commitment•
Such U.S. cuts do not present an automatic case for a British IND.
As long as there are more than token numbers of American soldiers 
stationed in Europe, the U.S. commitment is reasonably secure. The U.S. 
is unlikely to leave a conflict after American soldiers have been killed. 
There are currently no financial or political strains in the alliance 
that are strong enough to cause the U.S. to withdraw its forces from 
NATO. However, nobody knows what will happen in the future. The most 
obvious case for the U.S. to renounce its military guarantees to Europe 
has already been mentioned. If a Soviet offensive could not be repelled 
by conventional means, the U.S. might decide that a nuclear strike is not 
worth the risk of a Soviet reprisal, that saving the U.S. from a nuclear 
attack is more important than saving Western Europe from Soviet 
domination. Without the British IND, no other NATO nation would be able
to provide nuclear cover.
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It is also possible, although highly unlikely, for a political or 
financial dispute to split NATO. Towle mentions the possibility of a 
European move towards neutralism supposedly to isolate Europe from 
superpower disputes outside of Europe (3). This point is weaker now than 
it was in 1983 since tensions between the superpowers have been 
considerably relaxed and many Third World conflicts have died down. The 
current trends, however, could always be reversed. Looking at the 
situation from the other side of the Atlantic, he points out that the 
U.S. could become frustrated with the expense of NATO combined with the 
lack of European support for many aspects of U.S. foreign policy (4). 
Breaking-up NATO for these reasons is not likely. NATO has proven its 
ability to withstand major changes in its own structure and in the world 
at large. There also renains enough commonality of interest between the 
U.S. and Western Europe to render it irrational for either side of the 
Atlantic to sever its NATO ties, but rationality cannot be assured. An 
unfriendly end to NATO that involved Britain would pose special problems 
for the U.K. since it is dependent on the U.S. for the weapons of its 
IND. If Anglo-American ties were disrupted, it is unlikely that the U.S. 
would continue its nuclear cooperation with Britain. The implications of 
such a situation will be discussed later in this chapter.
The fundamental issue is that there are doubts about the U.S. 
commitment to Europe. These doubts have been a justification for the IND 
from its very beginning. They remain today as a reason in themselves for 
retention of the IND and as a foundation for many of its other 
justifications.
There is concern in Europe over the loss of the U.S. nuclear cover.
21
The fact that President Reagan considered the elimination of nuclear 
weapons at the Reykjavik Summit proved disturbing to our allies. One 
diplomat called it an "absolute and utter disaster.” (5). The British 
IND can be seen as an insurance policy against any withdrawal of the 
American nuclear guarantee (6). The French have been using this 
rationale for a long time to justify their independent deterrent (7).
They are also willing to pay twenty-five percent of their defense budget 
to maintain total nuclear independence (8). They can therefore be more 
open with their doubts about American reliability than the British who 
rely on the U.S. for their nuclear equipment.
The "second decision making center” is the second argument that is 
based on uncertainty over the U.S. nuclear guarantee. It is probably the 
most important strategic reason for the British IND, and it provides the 
British with a means to diplomatically express their unease (9). While 
the essential logic preceded him, it was Denis Healey, Labour Minister of 
Defence in the Wilson Government of the 1960*8, who was among the first 
to rely on this argument (10).
Minister of Defence Francis Pyra provides an excellent summary of the 
"second decision making center” reasoning. The U.S. is the most powerful 
nation in NATO. It has committed itself to the defense of NATO "by 
whatever means are necessary, without exception,'* and it has backed that 
commitment by actually deploying U.S. troops in Europe. However, the 
U.S. would be risking the devastation of its homeland if it were to use 
its nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. While the British 
Government supposedly has no doubts about the strength of the U.S. 
resolve to protect its NATO allies, the Soviets might.
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The United Kingdom, however, would be put directly at risk by any 
hostile Soviet military moves in Europe. A nation whose "survival in 
freedom" was under attack would be likely to use whatever weapons it had 
to protect itself. While the British have nowhere near the nuclear 
capabilities of the superpowers, they have enough destructive capability 
to inflict a considerable amount of damage on the Soviet Union. Even if 
the U.S. decides not to use its nuclear weapons in the defense of Western 
Europe, the second, independent nuclear force of the British could still 
hold the Soviets at risk. Soviet military calculations are made 
considerably more complicated by this second threat. Hopefully, the 
added danger represented by the IND will help to deter an attack on NATO 
in the first place (11). The French are not in NATO’s military structure 
and therefore cannot perform this role as well as the British (12).
The sanctuary argument is the third uncertainty based reason for a 
British IND. According to Freedman, there are two different versions of 
this theory. The first runs directly counter to the "second decision 
making center" rationale. Rather than use its missiles to defend Europe 
should the U.S. back down, Britain would follow the U.S. lead and rely on 
its position as an island nation and the destructive potential of the IND 
to isolate itself from the strife across the English Channel. Supposedly 
the Soviets would pick on weaker members of NATO before they would attack 
a nuclear armed Britain. The image presented by this version of the 
sanctuary argument is not nearly as noble as ^he one in the "second 
center" where Britain offers to use its missiles to protect an abandoned 
Western Europe. However, if Britain can preserve its freedom without 
putting itself at risk in a conflict on the Continent, it seems sensible
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for Britain to do so.
The second version of the sanctuary argument takes into account the 
importance that the British Isles would have as a staging area for 
operations on the Continent. If the U.S. were to stay and fight in 
Europe, the U.K. would be an important forward base for U.S. forces.
World War II operations like the Normandy invasion prove the validity of 
this point. While the Soviets may be willing to use nuclear weapons 
against concentrations of U.S. reinforcements in a nation that cannot 
respond in kind, they will be les3 willing to attack a nation with an 
IND. Britain's IND would provide defensive cover for U.S. forces at 
least until they crossed the English Channel. This argument is most 
effective in a situation where nuclear weapons have not yet been 
employed. The Soviet Union may not be willing to start such an exchange 
by attacking military targets in Britain. If nuclear exchanges have 
already begun, the value of the IND would be reduced (13).
The last uncertainty based reason for the IND is the trigger 
argument. It is more a way of keeping the U.S. tied to NATO than making 
up for a loss of U.S. nuclear capabilities. Because the British IND is 
based on the same missiles that the Americans use, the Soviets would not 
be able to distinguish between an American and a British attack, and the 
Soviets, if they fought back at all, would probably retaliate against the 
Americans. This would cause an American counterstrike (14). In another 
scenario, the U.S., realizing the Britain is launching one of its 
missiles, will launch a counterforcc strike to reduce the ability of the 
Soviets to retaliate (15).
In either case the British IND is a trigger for the much larger U.S,
force. Windsor asserts that the Soviets will be deterred from an attack
at least on Britain because they know that the IND could trigger the 
nuclear might of the United States. Essentially, Britain should keep an 
IND because it ties a superpower to the defense of the U.K. (16). These 
ties would not be as effective, however, if the U.S. had clearly backed 
away from a conflict. It also is not useable as an official 
justification. The U.S. would not be selling nuclear missiles to the 
U.K. if it thought that the U.K. planned to trap the U.S. in a nuclear 
war that it did not want.
Finally, British military strength has political dimensions. The 
U.K. spends more on its military in real, per capita, and percentage of 
gross domestic product terms than most other NATO nations (17). Of the 
L19,215 that; will be spent on defense in 1988-1989, 95% will go, either 
directly or indirectly, towards Britain's NATO commitments (18). The 
British Army of the Rhine's three divisions are responsible for defending 
a sixty-five kilometer section of the intra-German border. The U.K. also 
has forces ready to rapidly reinforce NATO's flanks. The RAF maintains 
fifteen squadrons in Germany. The Royal Navy is the largest of all of 
the European NATO navies. At the outbreak of tensions, it would provide 
70% of the ships in the East Atlantic and English Channel (19).
The IND gives Britain extra influence as the only European nuclear 
power in NATO. While this reason is not sufficient in itself to justify 
an IND, it can be added to oth^r reasons to push a pro-IND decision over 
the top. The so called "special relationship" between the U.S. and the 
U.K. is further enhanced by the nuclear cooperation between the two 
nations. While the U.S. is clearly the dominant partner in this
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relationship, the U.K. does have access to U.S. nuclear technolop 
strategic thinking beyond that of the other NATO allies.
The extent of Britain’s conventional contribution to NATO ai< is 
status as the only European NATO nation with strategic nuclear weapons 
give the U.K. influence in Western Europe beyond what its relative 
economic position and geographical location would dictate. Some of 
Britain’s allies see in the IND a channel for European influence on 
American nuclear policy and a way to balance the French force (20). The 
IND would give Britain an influential voice in the formation of any 
multinational, European nuclear force. In the 1960's, the presence of 
the IND was one factor that helped Britain defeat an American proposal 
for a Multilateral Force (21). Even Soviet analysts see Britain as a 
leader in Western European foreign policy (22) and as an influence on 
NATO nuclear strategy (23).
There is also an intangible element of prestige attached to the IND, 
a feeling that a nation armed with nuclear weapons commands more respect 
in the world. Whether or not this feeling has any basis in reality is 
debatable, but this justification has been used for the IND (24). It is 
true that the IND has allowed Britain a seat at the negotiations of 
several nuclear arms control treaties (25). The British, however, have 
been careful not to put their minimum deterrent at risk and have resisted 
its inclusion in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces talks and in bilateral 
superpower negotiations.
The final reason not to surrender the IND is that giving it up 
probably will not help the U.K. and may even hurt it. The Soviet Union 
has promised to destroy its missiles on a one for one basis with British
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disarmament. Should the British decide to totally leave the nuclear club 
and also expel foreign bases, the Soviets would also assure the U.K. that 
it is no longer a target for nuclear weapons (26). The value of these 
promises is dubious. First, the Soviets would retain an overwhelming 
portion of their arsenal while removing a complicating factor to their 
military decisions. Second, there is no way to verify the promise not to 
target Britain. It could tragically prove false. A British renunciation 
of the IND will probably be an irrelevant contribution to current arras 
control negotiations. The U.K. unilaterally renounced chemical weapons 
in the late 1950's. The U.S. stopped production of these weapons in 1969 
and has only recently resumed. Neither of these moves has had any impact 
on the rest of the world although there seems to have been some progress 
in recent talks (27).
Abandoning the IND could even be harmful to British interests. 
Britain's NATO allies see the IND as a balance to French forces and as a 
vehicle through which to make a European contribution to NATO nuclear 
decision making. It also helps to quell their own uncertainty about the 
U.S. nuclear guarantee (28). Surrendering the IND would be giving up a 
certain amount of influence in NATO. More importantly, it could lead to 
further U.S. frustration with its NATO allies and possibly even a 
decoupling of the U.S. from Europe. The unilateral surrender of the IND 
would be interpreted as another sign that the European branch of NATO was 
unwilling to provide for its own defense. Such a conclusion would be 
further reinforced if the U.K. took other steps, such as expelling U.S. 
nuclear bases from its territory, at the same time (29). The Labour 
Party has proposed unilateral British nuclear disarmament combined with
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the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from British soil (30)* The U.S. 
has been highly critical of these proposals and has warned of the damage 
that their implementation could do to NATO (31). The signals sent by 
cancelling the IND, especially in combination with other anti-nuclear 
moves, clearly could prove harmful to NATO unity and dangerous to 
Britain.
There is a strong case for keeping the IND, but it is not without 
some serious flaws. Critics of the IND attack it in two ways. They 
offer counter arguments to the various justifications for the IND, and 
they attempt to show that the IND is a dangerous and destabilizing force 
in its own right. The essential criticism is that there is no situation 
in which the IND can rationally be used. The Soviets, realizing this, 
will therefore not be deterred by the threat of its use (32). Britain is 
spending a considerable sum of money on a gun which the Soviets know is 
empty, not a wise investment by any means. Chalmers does an effective 
job of pointing out more specifically the weaknesses of the various 
justifications.
The first two pro-IND rationales see Britain providing nuclear cover 
for Western Europe either as the remaining nuclear power after a U.S. 
withdrawal or as a "second decision making center." Assuming that the 
Soviets decide to risk a nuclear reprisal and are able to successfully 
attack Western Europe without a U.S. nuclear response, it can be asked 
whether a relatively unharmed Britain would be any more willing than the 
U.S. to risk the devastating Soviet reprisal that would follow nuclear 
strike (33). The situation would be even more grave for Britain than for 
the U.S. since Britain is a smaller, more crowded country without the
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nuclear arsenal necessary for a devastating counterforce first strike.
The U.K. would probably be reluctant to commit national suicide, and, the 
Soviets, realizing this, would continue their attack.
The sanctuary arguments are next. Once again, the Soviets have 
invaded Western Europe and avoided a Western nuclear attack. Chalmers 
implicitly admits that the IND could spare the U.K. in the initial attack 
as the Soviets take on the non-nuclear Continental nations. Britain 
stands alone. The question is: could the IND keep it that way? Chalmers 
says no. If the Soviets lead off with a massive nuclear strike against 
the U.K., the IND will have failed its purpose of protecting Britain. At 
best, it could take a militarily useless revenge. If the Soviets launch 
a limited nuclear strike or even a purely conventional invasion, the IND 
is equally useless. In the face of a determined Soviet invasion, it 
would be best for the U.K. to engage in an "inch-by-inch defence of 
territory" and hope that popular resistance makes Soviet domination 
expensive and short lived. The alternative, use of the IND, risks the 
end of Britain itself (34).
In his attack on the second version of the sanctuary argument, 
Chalmers supposes that the U.S. had not backed out and that the conflict 
in Europe had already gone nuclear. Given this scenario, it is hard to 
believe that the nuclear exchanges could be limited to the Continent.
They would probably escalate beyond all possible control. It is also 
hard to believe that the Soviets would not target U.S. nuclear facilities 
in Britain. Once again, use of the IND, even in response to Soviet 
strikes, would lead to another Soviet nuclear attack on Britain (35).
The last justification for the IND is the trigger argument. The
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objections do not cone fron the strategic reasoning behind it. That is 
never directly challenged. Rather, the IND is criticized for its ability 
to start a much larger nuclear war. The trigger scenario is also not a 
particularly wise one to bring up around the United States. In any 
crisis, the U.S. would not want an ally with the power to trap U.S. 
nuclear weapons in a nuclear exchange that it does not want. Chalmers 
raises a strange sounding but strategically logical scenario in which the 
United States, facing a crisis in Europe, attacks Britain's nuclear 
weapons so that they cannot be used as a trigger (36). Chalmers neglects 
to mention that it is also true that if the U.S. clearly exempts itself 
from a conflict, the trigger argument loses much of its validity.
Britain would be back at one of the above scenarios.
In addition to questioning the strategic value of the IND, its 
critics also state that it hinders arms control, encourages 
proliferation, and lowers the nuclear threshold. Arms control issues 
will be considered in the last chapter. For now it is sufficient to say 
that Britain remaining as a nucleir power probably will not hinder any 
current negotiations. The latter two issues are discussed below.
Britain is a relatively secure country with strong allies for 
neighbors. It has close ties to one of the two superpowers, and has not 
been invaded for hundreds of years. However, Britain still argues that 
it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself against the uncertainties of a 
dangerous world. If a country in such a favorable position needs nuclear 
weapons to defend itself, won't other nations in less safe positions 
desire nuclear capabilities to guarantee their much more uncertain 
futures? Many of the rationales behind a British force could be easily
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adapted to the situations of Israel) South Korea, Iran, and a long list 
of other nations. Ending the IND may not prevent the near nuclear states 
from going nuclear anyway, but it would demonstrate that at least one of 
the nuclear states is serious about disarmament. The political pressure 
on the near nuclear states not to go nuclear would be increased (37).
The last reason to consider scraping the IND is that it takes money 
away from conventional defense thereby lowering the nuclear threshold.
The Trident program, for example, will consume from 11.5 to twenty 
percent of the defense equipment budget in its peak years (38). This 
would buy from three hundred to fourteen hundred Challenger tanks. It 
could also buy thirty Type 23 frigates or ten squadrons of Tornado 
fighters (39). All of the equipment mentioned is the best currently 
available in the British arsenal. For those who believe that the IND is 
useless as a deterrent, the investment in conventional weapons is a much 
wiser move. Rather than going to a showy, expensive nuclear system, the 
money would be better spent on weapons which can stop a Soviet attack 
before the conflict has to go nuclear thereby making a real contribution 
to security.
Clearly, there are strong arguments both for and against retention
of the IND. In reaching a conclusion, it must be remembered that the D
in IND stands for deterrent, not defense. As Francis Pym states,
The prime test of defence measures, above all in the nuclear 
field, is whether they help to make it less likely that aggressive 
war might be launched. How they might affect the course of such a 
war if it once started (sic) is essentially secondary. (AO).
It is true that the IND would be useless as a war-fighting tool. Even
with Trident, Britain could not endanger enough Soviet missile silos to
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sake the use of the IND anything but national suicide for Britain (41),
In his discussion of the switch from Trident I to Trident II, Nott 
acknowledged that a successful first strike by the British would be 
impossible (42). While the superpowers may have enough accurate warheads 
to contemplate using their arsenals against each other’s silos, Pym’s 
statement remains true. Superpower deterrence is still based on the 
concept of mutual assured destruction.
If a war starts, it means that the IND has failed in its essential 
mission, The important thing for deterrence is that the IND is there and 
that it can be used with devastating effect. One Soviet analyst 
estimates that the Polaris system can destroy twenty percent of Soviet 
industrial resources and kill the same proportion of the Soviet 
population (43). Trident could boost that to half of the Soviet 
industrial base and twenty-four to sixty-eight million deaths (44). The 
Soviet Union does not consider these risks immaterial. Some Soviet 
analysts are Impressed enough by the IND to conclude that the primary job 
of the Royal Navy is to launch nuclear strikes against vitally important 
enemy targets (45).
There probably is no scenario where a British use of the IND would 
help the U.K. militarily. However, when a Prime Minister is faced with a 
severe threat to the survival of the U.K. as a free and independent 
nation, it is hard to tell what s/he might do. S/he might, in 
desperation, turn to the IND even though its use would not be 
strategically sound. The Soviets have to take this unknown into 
consideration when contemplating an attack. The IND is capable of making 
the cost8 of a Soviet offensive higher than anything the Soviet Union
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would gain oy conquering Britain. Hopefully, the Soviets will conclude 
that moves against Britain would be too expensive to make them 
worthwhile.
The objection to the IND based on the fact that it might encourage 
nuclear proliferation is a harder one to counter. The argument that many 
of the justifications for the TND are not unique to the British 
situation, and may in fact be more relevant to the positions of other 
nations, is correct. Looking at history, however, weakens the 
proliferation criticism. First, Britain has beer involved with nuclear 
weapons for a long time, and many of the justifications for the IND are 
decades old. This time span is sufficiently long that any proliferation 
because of the IND should be clear by now, Despite the long term 
presence of the IND and its rationales, the number of nuclear nat is has 
remained remarkably stable. The nuclear club has only six confirmed 
members, and its real total is probably still under ton, It does rot 
appear that the IND has had any effect on proliferation even though it 
theoretically could. Second, as with chemical weapons, unilateral 
British nuclear disarmament would probably prove irrelevant. Given the 
potential dangers of unilaterally renouncing the iND, the outside chance 
that it may retard proliferation is not worth the risk.
On the issue of conventional weapons, it should be noted that, while 
keeping the IND may lower the nuclear threshold, abandoning the IND could 
lower the conventional threshold by making Western Europe safer for 
conventional war. Since the early 1950's, British analysts have felt 
that investing in nuclear weapons provides more deterrent power for less 
money than trying to match the Soviets in conventional weapons (46). An
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examination of the tank balance in Europe shows this to be correct.
Looking at all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals reveals 15,400 
NATO tanks compared to 51,000 WTO ones (47). Taking the most optimistic 
figure from above, 1,400 new tanks, would merely cut the WTO advantage 
from 3.3i1 to 3.0:1. On NATO's Central Front in West Germany, NATO has 
8,100 tanks to defend against 17,000 WTO ones (48). Even here, adding 
1,400 new tanks would still leave the WTO with a 1.8:1 advantage over 
NATO. If the Soviets were given a choice between Britain acquiring the 
tanks or Trident, they would almost assuredly pick the tanks.
In the end, the arguments for retaining the IND outweigh the 
arguments for renouncing it. A reasonable case can be made that it does 
make a contribution to deterrence even though it is hard to see a 
rational scenario for its use in a war. The objections based on 
proliferation and conventional weapons are not strong enough to outweigh 
the deterrence factor. Finally, it is impossible to know whether or not 
the tl.S. nuclear guarantee of Europe is strong until there 1b a crisis) 
but then it would be too late to start rebuilding an abandoned IND. It 
is probably the wisest move for the U.JC. to keep its IND if only as an 
insurance policy against a U.S. decision to abandon Europe to save itself 
from a Soviet strike.
The above scenarios are generally based on Britain using its IND in 
a time of crisis. Hidden in them is the assumption that any problem with 
the U.S. nuclear guarantee will manifest itself only after the crisis has 
started. By that time, the U.S. could not prevent the European nations 
from using whatever weapons they had available to defend themselves.
That assumption is particularly relevant in the case of the IND. Britain
has relied on the U.S. for nuclear weapons ever since the cancellation of 
Blue Streak in 1960. The question of what would happen to the IND if the 
U.S. were to decide not to help the U.K. has not yet been discussed.
It must be reinembei ed that cost has always been an element in the 
nuclear consensus. Blue Streak was cancelled in 1960 partly because 
upgrading it to the necessary level of performance was considered too 
expensive. In 1966, one of the main reasons that the Labour Government 
decided to keep Polaris was that it was "extraordinarily cheap." (69). 
Cost also was an element in the decision to go with Chevalinn rattier than 
Poseidon. Finally, much of the Trident debate centered on the expense of 
the now weapon. While there is a reasonably good case for the INI), even 
the best arguments cannot overcome what Chichester and Wilkinson describe 
as the "Reality of Penury" (50).
Without U.S. assistance to make the IND affordable, it is hard to 
believe that the British would maintain strategic nuclear weapons. If 
ttie U.S. were to cut off help in the middle of a woopon system's life# 
the U.K. has the technical ability to keep the missiles operational for a 
time. However, unless a deal could be made with France, and that 
possibility is questionable, even a Conservative Government would find it 
difficult to develop a replacement system. Franco has been able to 
maintain a totally independent force by devoting over twenty percent of 
its defense budget to it (51), In the U.K., many are concerned about the 
expense of Trident 11. It will cost an average of three percent of the 
defense budget over its entire procurement period (52). It is unlikely 
that the British will change their historical reluctance to spond large 
sums of money on the IND, but, unless they do, they will remain dependent
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on the U.S. for the weapons of the IND.
Up to now, the problems of dependency have not proven 
insurmountable. The British confidence that the U.S. will remain a 
reliable supplier is demonstrated in the decision in the early 1980*8 to 
keep an INI) and to replace the aging Polaris system with the new Trident 
one. The Conservatives will control Parliament until 1991 or 1992, 
depending on when they choose to call the next general election. By that 
time, Trident will ’e too far down the road to be changed for another 
system. It can be asked, however, whether or not Trident was the best 
choice among the alternatives, That issue will now be considered.
CHAPTER THREE
CRITERIA FOR THE IND AND TRIDENT
If Britain is to Keep an IND, its form still needs to be discussed. 
The Thatcher Government has opted for the Trident II D-5 missile, but is 
that the best choice gi/en Britain's needs? This chapter will discuss 
the criteria for an effective IND, evaluate Trident II based on those 
criteria, and examine tie political debate over the Trident decision.
The next chapter will look at some of the alternative systems based on 
the same criteria used for Trident.
Even with Trident, the Thatcher Government claims that the IND will 
remain a minimum force of last resort (1). While some will dispute the 
assertion that Trident is a minimum force, it is true that Trident will 
represent a minor proportion of the superpower arsenals (2). To fulfil) 
the role of a small, last resort deterrent, a candidate system must meet 
four essential requirements. These requirements are tough, but so is the 
job of the IND. The superpowers can afford to develop several different 
weapons and base them in several different ways so that the disadvantages 
of one system are compensated for by the advantages of another. The 
French do the same but at the cost of a portion of their defense budget 
that the British would not be willing to pay. Given the amount of money 
they wish to spend, the British are limited to one system. When all the 
eggs have to be put into one basket, that basket had better good.
First, a candidate for the IND must be able to survive any attempt 
to destroy it. This includes a "bolt from the blue" nuclear strike. If 
the Soviets think that they can wipe out the IND in a preemptive strike, 
the IND would attract rather than deter an attack. Second, the warheads
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must be able to strike their intended targets* If the vehicles that 
carry them are unreliable or are vulnerable to defensive measures, then 
the deterrence value of the force would be greatly reduced. Third, the 
IND must be independent. Independence includes not only the availability 
of the weapons themselves but also of needed maintenance, spare parts, 
command and communications facilities, and intelligence data. If the IND 
is reliant upon another nation to the extent that the other nation can 
prevent its effective use, then many of the arguments for an IND are no 
longer valid. Its deterrence value will decline. Finally, the cost of 
the system must be reasonable in relation to the benefits expected from 
it. While nuclear weapons may have a more powerful deterrent effect than 
conventional weapons, the latter are still necessary for a sound, 
balanced military policy. There are two components to cost, capital and 
life-cycle. The former refers to what it will cost to initially acquire 
the system. The second covers operations and mid-life improvements. By 
the time it is retired in the middle of the 1990*s, Polaris will have 
been in service for over twenty-five years. If the next system lasts as 
long, it will start around 1995 and end in 2020. This is a good time 
frame to measure life-cycle costs.
Trident easily meets the invulnerability criterion. Ballistic 
missile submarines are generally acknowledged to be most survivable leg 
of the strategic triad of ground launched missiles, bombers, and 
submarines. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has ever been 
able to track a Polaris submarine (3). The 6,000 nautical mile range of 
the D-5 more than doubles the 2,500 nautical mile range of Polaris. In 
order to stay in range of Moscow, a Polaris submarine is restricted to
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the Northeast Atlantic, an area where the Soviets can concentrate their 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts. The D-5 missile opens up all of 
the North and a good deal of the South Atlantic. Even the Indian Ocean 
is available for patrols if a second submarine is available while the 
first rounds the Cape of Good Hope. This is a hopelessly large area to 
patrol without tremendous and unlikely advances in ASW.
With a four boat force, the Governaent is only willing to guarantee 
one subaarine on patrol at all times (A). In the unlikely event that 
this boat is found) the entire IND would be at risk. However, Trident 
submarines will be able to go twice as long as Polaris submarines between 
refits. This means that two to three submarines will usually be 
available for patrol should the Government choose to use them (5). If a 
crisis emerges, extra submarines can be put to sea thereby increasing 
IND*s chances for survival. Trident is not discrete in the sense that 
the launching of a ballistic missile would reveal the position of the 
submarine (6). At least two boats would have to be on patrol for one to 
fire a warning shot.
The D-5 force should prove to be highly reliable. Ballistic missile 
technology has been around for a long time, and the U.K. has had 
considerable experience in producing warheads for and operating these 
weapons* This experien e may have been a factor in the decision to 
replace Polaris with a ballistic, rather than a cruise, missile (7). It 
is likely that eighty to ninety percent of a submarine's missiles will 
work properly when launched (8). Assuming sixteen missiles per submarine 
and eight warheads per missile, at least twelve missiles (9) should work 
sending ninety-six warheads to their targets. The actual number of
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working missiles will probably be higher.
The next question is whether those warheads will actually reach 
their targets. The answer is right now is yes. Trident D-5 missiles are 
accurate enough to destroy Soviet missiles in their silos. That is far 
beyond what Britain needs. British targeting policy is so secret that 
even the captains of the Polaris boats do not know where their missiles 
are aimed (10). That the British threaten "key aspects of Soviet state 
power" (11) is all that is known to the public. This almost certainly 
means Moscow and probably also includes other Soviet population, 
military, and industrial centers. Trident missiles are more than 
accurate enough for this mission. As Cook points out, "it is a matter of 
indifference whether your warhead descends to the left or to the right of 
Red Square." (12). It is clear that the warheads will be able to find 
their targets, but will they be able to reach them?
Ballistic missile warheads are small and very fast, covering over 
four miles every second. This makes them very difficult, if not 
impossible, to stop (13). The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limits both 
superpowers to two ABM sites of up to a hundred defensive missiles each. 
The Soviets have a small ABM system around Moscow (14). Even if the 
Soviets were to go to the maximum of a hundred ABMs around Moscow and 
each one were to do its job perfectly, a single Tr.dent submarine could 
still launch enough warheads to get some through. If the Moscow 
criterion were dropped, the undefended new targets would be easily 
destroyed resulting in possibly more disruption than would concentrating 
Trident's power on Moscow alone.
In the future, advances in ABM technology could possibly provide an
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effective defense against a small nuclear power like Britain. This is a 
problem with all small forces regardless of the system chosen, but 
Trident II does have a few useful features that could help to counter 
these developments. First, it is not limited to eight warheads per 
missile. Up to six more warheads or decoys can be added, at the 
sacrifice of some range, to further confuse defenses. Second, the D-5 
missile will be in service with the U.S. Navy for most of the time that 
the British will be using it. This commonality enables the British to 
take advantage of any ABM penetration aids devised by the U.S. to keep 
its own fleet effective.
Independence is one area where the Trident system is weak. There 
are two dimensions to independence! supply/maintenance and operational. 
Trident is most vulnerable in the first area. The missiles will not only 
be supplied by the U.S., but they will also be stored and maintained by 
the U.S. at King's Bay. This saves money both initially and throughout 
the life of the system* It also leaves Britain vulnerable to a U.S. 
decision to stop supplying the missiles. Such a step is highly unlikely, 
but if the U.S. were cut Britain off, the IND would not necessarily be 
ended. The missiles have an in tube life of about seven years (15), 
probably enough time to make alternate arrangements. If such 
arrangements cannot be made, Britain is not lacking in the scientific and 
technical expertise to develop domestic facilities to service the 
missiles. Such a move, however, would be extremely expensive. A 
Government only nominally committed to the IND may not be willing to make 
so large an investment. There might also be a dangerous gap between when 
the last missiles are no longer operational and when Britain has the
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facilities to replace or recondition them.
Assuming that the U.S. supplies the missiles as planned, the 
operational independence of Trident still needs to be assessed. Trident 
will be committed to the defense of NATO by agreement with the U.S. and 
will be targeted according to NATO’s Scheduled Strike Plan (16).
However, the U .£. will retain control over the use of Trident missiles 
and can act independently picking its own targets if necessary. In 
criticizing Trident’s dependence on the U.S., Chalmers points out that 
both the submarines and the missiles will rely on U.S. Navstar satellites 
for pinpoint accuracy in navigation. This type of accuracy is necessary 
for hitting military targets, but even he acknowledges that it probably 
is not essential given the British targeting doctrine (17).
The estimated capital cost for the project is L9,043 million ove* 
the period 1980-2000. This makes Trident II one of the most expensive 
options to initially acquire. When the operational costs of Trident II 
are added up, however, it is likely to be one of the most inexpensive 
systems to operate over its life cycle. Operational expenditures on 
Polaris consume less than two percent of the defense budget. The figure 
for Trident is likely to be even lower since the submarines can go twice 
as long between refits.
Trident also has the advantages of commonality with the United 
States. Using King's Bay will save construction and maintenance charges. 
More importantly, Britain will not suffer the penalties of uniqueness. 
Chevaline was a very expensive program made even more burdensome by the 
fact that the U.K. had to shoulder all of the costs. The remotoring of 
the Polaris missiles in the early 1980*s cost the British more per
missile than the Americans since the U.K. had to pay extra to reopen the 
Polaris facilities. The D-5 will be in service with the U.S. for most of 
the time that Britain expects to use it. First, the British can benefit 
from U.S. research and development on Trident without paying the full 
cost of it. Second, all of the missiles come from a common pool at 
King's Bay. Britain will not have to worry about making special 
arrangements for repair. If a major defect emerges, all of the missiles 
would have to be fixed resulting in lower costs per unit than if the U.K. 
had to make special arrangements.
The Trident II system is generally acknowledged to be the most 
capable submarine based system available. With the exception of the 
supply/maintenance area of independence, it is more than adequate as a 
replacement for the Polaris minimum deterrent. Even that one weakness 
could be overcome, albeit at a high price. The debate over acquisition 
of this system, however, was heated. The left-wing Guardian was even 
moved to refer to Priwe Minister Thatcher as the "Right Hon. ICBM for 
Finchley." (18).
It first must be noted that any debate over a Polaris replacement 
was bound to become heated. This debate presented a visible, public 
forum to discuss the IND in general. There have been opponents to the 
IND ever since its beginning, but Polaris has not offered any 
opportunities for criticisms that would attract the attention and 
emotions of the general public. In many ways, Polaris fills the minimum 
deterrent niche very well. It is too small and inaccurate to pose a 
destabilizing threat to Soviet nuclear forces, but it is powerful enough 
for a devastating retaliation. There has not yet been a crisis where it
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has come even close to being used. It has proven reliable and advanced 
enough to remain effective and in service for over twenty-five years. 
Finally, its low operational costs are a small price to pay for the 
deterrence and prestige benefits already discussed in Chapter Two. It is 
unfortunate that there is no modern weapon system that can play the role 
of minimum deterrent as well as Polaris has done. All of the possible 
successor systems have flaws. If the chosen one could be defeated, then 
there was a chance for the IND to slowly die.
The decision to purchase Trident II posed additional problems which 
intensified the debate. While it can be argued that the proposed 
alternatives are inadequate for a minimum, last resort deterrent, the D-5 
system has possibly quantitative and definitely qualitative capabilities 
beyond that role. It is also a very expensive system to acquire. This 
combination made it several enemies.
The Polaris A-3 missile has three warheads, but. they are not 
independently targetable. This means that a submarine can only fire on 
sixteen targets. The D-5*s will have eight warheads each, this is 2 2/3 
as many warheads as Polaris but eight times its targeting capacity. If a 
Polaris submarine provides an adequate deterrent with sixteen targets, it 
can be asked why Trident requires 128, especially since the increased 
availability of Trident allows more than one boat to be on patrol for 
most of the time, In fact, that was the first question in the House of 
Commons after Defence Minister John Nott announced the decision to 
substitute D-5 missiles for the previously planned C-4*s. Mr. John 
Silkin (Labour Member for Deptford) accused the Conservative Government 
of escalating the arms race and violating the spirit of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (19). Article VI of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty calls on its signatories to "pursue negotiations in good faith" to 
end the arms race and to promote disarmament (20), The eightfold 
increase in targeting capacity seemed inconsistent with that pledge.
The second problem with the D-5's was that their counterforce 
accuracy is not necessary given the official targeting policy. Some 
accused the Government of abandoning the previous deterrent strategy and 
seeking a first strike force (21). More reasonable critics still 
questioned the necessity of a hard target kill capability and condemned 
any move away from deterring a nuclear war to initiating one (22). 
Chalmers postulates a decapitation attack which would disrupt the Soviet 
command and communication centers for long enough for the US., if only 
to prevent a retaliation against U.S. targets, to wipe out the remaining 
Soviet nuclear forces (23). Even some Conservatives were concerned that 
Britain was buying a superpower weapon (24).
The Government has taken several steps to defuse these criticisms.
On the question of escalation, it points out that the Soviets now have 
five times as many strategic warheads as they had in 1970. Trident, 
however, will have at most 2\  times as many warheads as Polaris (25).
This means that, even if the strategic arsenals of the superpowers are 
cut by fifty percent, Trident II warheads will represent about the same 
proportion of Soviet totals as Polaris did when it entered full service 
in 1970 (26). This argument is an attempt to show that Trident will be 
no more threatening to the Soviets now than Polaris, a relatively 
uncontroversia1 weapon, was when it was introduced. This justification 
is less compelling than it seems on the surface when Trident's increased
range, accuracy, and eightfold increase in targeting capacity are 
considered (27).
Second, improvements in Soviet missile defenses over the next thirty 
years need to be taken into account. The extra warheads are presented as 
"long-term insurance" against improvements in Soviet ABM technology (28). 
When the C-4 was still under consideration, the possibility of 
"deMIRVing" it was studied. It was concluded that such a program would 
cost more money and provide less capability than simply buying the MIRVed 
reentry vehicles from the United States (29). In supporting the 0 4  
decision, the Defence Committee of the House of Commons accepted the 
extra capabilities of the earlier missile as simply a "by-product" of 
acquiring the only system that they considered adequate to Britain’s 
needs (30).
The greater warhead capacity and enhanced accuracy of the D-5 
presented additional justification problems. In response, Defence 
Minister Nott clearly stated that the decision to go to D-5 had nothing 
to do with its superiority to the C-4. He acknowledged that "Trident C-4 
would be sufficient to (British) deterrent needs." (31). Rather, he 
desired to maintain commonality with the U.S. for the advantages 
described earlier. In order to defuse some possible criticism, the 
number of warheads for D-5 was limited to the number originally planned 
for C-4 (32). Nott specifically renounced any U.K. desire for a first 
strike stating that the U.K. force would be too small to successfully 
carry out such an attack (33).
Since even the Government admitted that it did not need the 
capabilities of Trident II, some critics who wished to keep the IND
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questioned the wisdom of paying for it when cheaper alternatives were 
available. The comparatively low cost per "unit" of deterrence of 
nuclear weapons has always been an element in the consensus behind them. 
To many of those who wanted to keep the IND, the expense of Trident 
appeared to be a dangerous threat to cost element of the IND consensus. 
The decision to switch to the D-5 pushed spending plans back by several 
years. Cancellation charges would not be too high for the next 
Governmeni to terminate a weapon which, at the time, only the 
Conservatives backed. There was concern that the D-5 would be killed and 
with it the whole IND. A cheaper system was said to be more politically 
survivable (34). Fortunately for Trident, the Conservatives won the 
following two elections, and most of the planned funds will have been 
spent or committed by the next general election. However, concerns over 
cost still need to be addressed.
As far back as the decision to acquire the D-5, the British defense 
budget was under stress from high inflation, increased fuel costs, and 
salary increases for the military. Despite the annual three percent real 
increases in defense spending requested by NATO, program cuts were 
needed. By the 1985-1986 session of Parliament, even the three percent 
increases were gone (35). From 1985-1986 to 1988-1989, real defense 
spending will only increase by four percent (36). However, during this 
time approximately forty percent of the Trident expenditures will come 
due (37). Trident will consume 5.5 percent of the defense budget and 
11.7 percent of the equipment budget in the budget year 1988-1989 (38). 
The conventional weapons budget has been hurt by Trident with the Royal 
Navy being hit particularly hard. Its budget in current pounds has
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declined since 1986 (39). The order rate of modern, Type 23 frigates has 
declined (40), and there will probably be a gap in the construction of 
hunter-killer submarines as facilities are used for Trident boats (41).
It is understandable that many in the Royal Navy have come to see Trident 
as a "serious 'cuckoo* in the naval nest." (42).
The Government has justified these expenditures in two ways. First, 
it claims that the critics miss the point. While it is true that the 
conventional weapons budget is hurt, the lost conventional systems could 
not possibly have anywhere near the deterrence value of Trident (43). 
Second, the Government points out that conventional weapons programs, 
especially the Tornado aircraft, have cost even more than Trident. By 
stating that the capital cost of Trident is only three percent of the 
defense budget over its entire procurement period (1980-2000) and that 
conventional weapons systems have cost even more than that, the 
Government hopes to make the cost of Trident more palatable (44).
The number of objections to Trident continues to die down as the 
system progresses. Those who wanted the IND to be based on another 
system have for the most part accepted that now it will be Trident or 
nothing. The question remains, however, as to whether they were right. 
Would another IND replacement have met the needs of the U.K. less 
expensively than Trident?
CHAPTER FOUR
ALTERNATIVES TO TRIDENT
Several different systems would provide Britain with strategic 
nuclear weapons capabilities. Hobbs lists twenty-three options for an 
IND including Trident II (l). There are more than that if one wishes to 
be creative. However, not all systems are equally suited to tho IND 
role, and the number of likely alternatives to Trident II is considerably 
smaller than the number of all possible configurations. Before examining 
the alternative systems, it would be useful to once again note that the 
British aro not looking to add new weapons to an already substantial 
stockpile. If the a system fails, Britain will be left without any 
nuclear cover. Therefore, the delivery vehicles must survive even a 
"bolt from the blue” Soviet strike. The warheads must be able to reach 
their targets, and the independence of the system must not be easily cut 
by an outside power. If those three criteria are not satisfied, it does 
not matter how inexpensive an option is. It would still be a waste of a 
considerable amount of money to buy it.
When looking at options for the IND, there are two variables that 
need to be consideredt basing mode and delivery vehicle. The three 
basing modes, ground launched missiles, manned aircraft, and submarines, 
will be considered first followed by a discussion of some of the more 
likely delivery vehicles.
Ground launched missiles can be either fixed or mobile. The first 
option, keeping missiles in fixed silos, can be immediately dismissed as 
a basing option for the IND. The Soviet Union would have no trouble 
decimating a small British force. If a system were to be ground based,
48
49
it would have to be mobile# Mobile missiles are just as vulnerable as 
fixed ones when they are at their main base. Therefore, a certain 
percentage of British missiles would have to be kept dispersed to guard 
against a "bolt from the blue." Dispersion would mean frequent, large 
missile convoys moving on Britain's highways and/or railways accompanied 
by all sorts of political and security problems. Such an operation would 
keep nuclear weapons in the forefront of peoples minds and could easily 
evaporate the IND's current popular support (see Chapter Five) (2). Even 
if these problems could be solved, it is unlikely that even dispersed 
ground based missiles could meet the high survivability standards 
necessary for the IND (3).
Manned aircraft are equally vulnerable to a surprise attack. 
Airfields are large targets that could be easily wiped out in a Soviet 
first strike. The short flight time of missiles from the Soviet Union to 
tho U.K. would mean that the planes would need to be airborne within 
minutes of a warning (4). Even then, there is no guarantee that the 
planes could get away in time. Alternatively, aircraft could be kept 
permanently airborne. However, support facilities would be expensive to 
maintain and would be vulnerable to a first strike. Keeping a nuclear 
weapons carrier permanently airborne above a small country would also 
present the possibility for a dangerous accident. Finally, if the 
airfields are destroyed, the British would be faced with either using the 
IND, whether or not they want to, or losing it. This lack of flexibility 
is a serious drawback (5).
While the missiles would be seriously vulnerable in both of the 
above basing modes, there is still a chance that some would survive.
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That is not enough for the IND. The vulnerability of the ground and 
aircraft based systems would give the Soviets a good chance of launching 
a successful, disarming first strike thereby inviting the attack that the 
IND is meant to deter. It is immaterial that a few missiles could 
survive to take revenge. Vengeance is a poor substitute for deterrence. 
Ground and aircraft basing simply do not satisfy the survivability 
criterion. Only submarines do. In fact, the Defence Committee hardly 
mentioned non-submarine based systems in their official report (6).
While submarines may eventually become vulnerable to advances in ASW, the 
other two basing methods are highly vulnerable right now.
Submarines can be armed with either ballistic or cruise missiles.
The three main ballistic missile alternatives to Trident D-5 are 
extending the life of Polaris, buying Trident I C-4 missiles from the 
U.S., or cooperating with the French on a missile. These three options 
will be compared to Trident II in turn» A discussion of the relative 
merits of the cruise missile will follow.
The Chevaline improvements to the Polaris should permit Polaris 
warheads to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses into at least the middle of the 
next decade. However, the submarines that the carry the missiles are 
aging. By the middle of the 1990's, the hulls will be near the end of 
their life. Even if hull life could be extended, the submarines will 
become increasingly noisy with age and therefore more vulnerable to 
improvements in Soviet ASW. As the propulsion and other systems get 
older, maintenance time and costs will rise, and other age related 
defects might emerge. These problems could be serious enough that it 
would be impossible to guarantee at least one submarine on patrol at all
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tines (7). Even if the Polaris missiles themselves are kept, the 
submarines that carry them would have to be replaced.
The current Polaris missiles have a range of 2,500 nautical miles. 
There was some consideration given to upgrading the motors of the Polaris 
missiles to increase their r^nge, although not even to the standards of 
Trident C-4 (8). The reduced range of the missiles is some matter for 
concern, especially if only four new submarines are produced. Four boats 
can only guarantee that one submarine will be on patrol at all times.
That submarine would have a limited area of operations in which Soviet 
ASW efforts would be concentrated in a war. This puts the level of 
survivability of even an enhanced range Polaris missile below that of the 
same size fleet of Trident D-5 submarines. However, placing the old 
Polaris missiles in new submarines would be substantially less expensive 
than Trident II raising the possibility of building a fifth submarine.
It could then be guaranteed that at least two boats will be on patrol at 
all times countering the problem of reduced range.
Polaris is not nearly as accurate as Trident D-5, but it is accurate 
enough for the British targeting doctrine. It has been the vehicle for 
that doctrine since the late 1960's. Two other factors are of greater 
importance when considering Polaris. First, the missiles may no longer 
function reliably given their advanced age. While flaws could be 
detected and fixed, albeit at a price, such detection requires a testing 
program which Britain may find too expensive to operate (9). Second, 
even with the Chevaline upgrade, the warheads may not be able to 
penetrate Soviet ABM defenses in the next century (10). However, 
specific evidence of this eventual lack of penetration ability was not
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even given to the Defence Comittee. The Gilbert alternative to the 1981 
Defence Committee report expressed concern that the Ministry of Defence 
was ignoring a much less expensive option in order to cover ABM 
challenges that may not emerge (11). As it turns out, the Chevaline 
program probably was not needed, but Britain may not be so lucky in the 
future.
If the Polaris missiles eventually do become vulnerable to Soviet 
ABM defenses, a modernization or replacement program, probably including 
expensive new missiles and possibly new submarines, would be needed well 
before Trident II would have to be replaced. Sticking with Polaris means 
gambling that Soviet ABM improvements will be minor (12). It should be 
remembered that each Polaris submarine can carry only forty-eight 
non-MIRVed warheads which can be aimed in groups of three at only sixteen 
targets. Hobbs considers this target coverage to be insufficient for 
effective future deterrence (13). Even if the British only wanted to hit 
Moscow, and that city is almost definitely on the target tapes, the ABM 
Treaty allows the Soviets to install up to a hundred defensive missiles 
around Moscow. Therefore, there is some chance that the Soviets might be 
able to defend Moscow from a Polaris attack even if the ABM Treaty 
remains intact. Since the British can aftord only one strategic nuclear 
system, it would be best if the doubts about its ability to penetrate 
Soviet defenses were minimal.
Polaris would definitely be an independent system. The production 
lines for the missiles and related equipment will all have been long 
closed by the time that the new submarines are ready. Also, Britain 
would be the only major nuclear nation using such outdated technology.
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The U.K. would have to pay extra to have many of the needed parts custom 
manufactured. The necessity of maintaining such outdated technology is a 
definite drawback (14). On the question of operational independence, the 
British consider Polaris to be independent enough now to be used without 
U.S. input. There is no reason for that to change in the future. In 
fact, all of the ballistic missile systems under consideration satisfy 
the criterion of operational independence.
Cost is a major consideration with keeping Polaris. The capital 
cost of this option will be much lower, but future events may nullify the 
initial advantage. Putting the old missiles in new submarines would cost 
around 1/3,000 million, forty percent of the capital cost of the Trident I 
system and clearly less the more expensive Trident II (15). Estimates 
for an enhanced range Polaris place its cost over that of the Trident I 
system, but probably less than Trident II (16). The unique, 
technologically obsolete Polaris system would cost Britain more to 
operate than will the Trident II system (17). The authors of the Gilbert 
Report were not convinced that, compared to the C-4 system then under 
consideration, the extra operational costs would offset the initial 
capital savings (18). If the operational savings would not offset the 
capital savings with C-4, then they certainly will not with D-5.
The question is whether Polaris will remain an effective system 
until 2020. If it turns out that, looking at the situation in 2020, 
Polaris would still be able to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses, then the 
Thatcher Government would have missed a bargain. If the opposite is true 
and, well before 2020, ABM defenses progress to the point that Polaris 
warheads could be stopped, then the Government has saved money b> buying
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a modern system now. The latter is likely enough to conclude that 
Polaris should be honorably retired in favor of a more up to date system.
The C-4 option is harder to dismiss. The U.K. once considered 
purchasing the C-4 to replace Polaris and only changed its mind when the 
Eeagan Administration in October, 1981, two years earlier than expected, 
decided to develop the D-5 (19). Minister of Defence Nott acknowledged 
that C-4 would have been "sufficient" for Britain's deterrent needs. He 
denied that Britain switched to D-5 missiles for their extra 
capabilities. Rather, Nott justified the change on the advantages that 
come from maintaining commonality with the U.S. (20). No details are 
given, but it is claimed that the life cycle costs of operating a unique 
C-4 system will more than offset its initial savings over the D-5 (21). 
Whether or not those life-cycle cost estimates are true is the real 
question.
Trident C-4 missiles have a range of about 4,000 nautical miles with 
eight warheads, the number that the U.K. planned to use (22). This would 
give the a C-4 submarine more than enough ocean in which to hide. The
2,000 nautical milos extra range of the D-5 is an unnecessary bonus.
The accuracy of the C-4 is an improvement over that of Polaris, 
which was already judged capable enough given the British targeting 
strategy. The C-4 is also a MIRVed missile (23). With eight warheads 
per missile and sixteen missiles per submarine, the U.K. would have 128 
warheads on patrol at all times. This should be enough to counter Soviet 
ABM improvements for a long time.
The C-4 missile presents the same problems of uniqueness that 
Polaris does. The C-4 entered service with the U.S. Navy in 1979* It
55
was assumed at the time that the U.K. decided to buy C-4 that there would 
be at least some overlap between the U.S. and the U.K. forces giving the 
U.K. the advantages of commonality with the United States. Reagan's 
decision to accelerate the D-5 program moved the introduction date of the 
missile to 1989 (24). C-4 will leave service with the U.S. by the late
3.990's, only a few years after the U.K. will have started using the C-4. 
The overlap period will be loss than that of Polaris. The U.K. will lose 
the operational benefits of learning from the experiences and testing 
program of vhe U.S. Navy. Britain can not afford a testing program on 
the same scale as the U.S. can. If a major repair or improvement program 
is neededi Britain will have to pay the full cost. The remotoring of and 
Chevaline enhancement to the Polaris missiles show how expensive such 
programs can be (25).
The capital cost for a C-4 missile system in September, 1980 prices 
was L5,100 million. Switching to D-5 missiles added L390 million to tho 
cost. The expense of the larger hull needed to carry the D-5 is hidden 
in a L500 million submarine improvement package which also includes a 
better sonar and a better propulsion system (26). It is therefore 
difficult to tell the exact cost of converting to D-5, It is also 
difficult to figure out how much more expensive it would be to operate 
for twenty-five years a missile system unique to the U.K. (27), and the 
Ministry of Defence does not give any figures.
One cost advantage of the D-5 is that the missiles will be serviced 
in the U.S. base at King's Bay, Georgia. This shift saved 1.770 million 
in construction costs offsetting to a large degree the expense of moving 
to D-5. The U.K. will pay around L9 million a year to compensate the
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U.S. for operations at King’s Bay that are related to the U.K. portion of 
the workload (28). The King’s Bay arrangement probably means that there 
will be a savings on missile upkeep compared to independent U.K. 
maintenance of C-4. The definite reduction in capital costs and the 
probable reduction in lifetime missile maintenance costs when taken 
together cancel out the added expense that the switch to D-5 initially 
represented. Should a mid-life upgrade be necessary for Trident, it will 
be less expensive for the British to share the costs with the U.S. on a 
D-5 improvement rather than to independently upgrade the C-4 (29). In 
fact, the advanced capabilities of the D-5 make the chances for a 
necessary upgrade less likely than with C-4.
The C-4 is better matched to the requirements of the U.K. than is 
the D-5 with all of its added capabilities. If the advantages of 
commonality with the U.S. could have been maintained, the C-4 would have 
been a better, less expensive choice than the D-5. However, it seems 
likely that the C-4 will have a higher lifetime cost than the D-5 tipping 
the scales in favor of the latter.
The last ballistic missile option that will be considered is the 
purchase of a French system. The data does not indicate that the British 
Government seriously considered this option. Pym, without further 
explanation, dismissed a European project as not as capable as but more 
expensive than Trident C-4 (30). The lack of consideration given to 
French systems makes details on them scarce. There is also little 
evidence that the proponents of the French option considered whether or 
not France would be willing to sell nuclear missiles to Britain (31). At 
best, the French would be reluctant to make such a sale (32). However,
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had Britain decided to approach the French with an offer, there were two 
possible missiles that it could nave bought from them, the M~4 and the 
M-5. Since the M-5 only started development in 1987 (33), there is no 
way that it can be ready in the time necessary for a Polaris replacement. 
That leaves the M-4. Any deal would involve Britain buying French 
missiles and providing its own warheads and submarines (34)• Britain has 
the technological lead in the latter two areas (35).
The M-4 is about the size of a Polaris missile. It can carry six,
150 kiloton warheads. The M-4 has a range of 2,200 to 2,600 nautical 
miles, about the same as Polaris (36). This does restrict the operating 
room of the British submarines to potentially hostile waters.
Hobbs also expresses doubts about the reliability of the French 
missiles (37). This would be of special concern to the British given the 
small size of their IND. No details are given anywhere on how vulnerable 
the M-4 warheads will be to improvements in Soviet ABM defenses.
Independence from the U.S. is a mixed advantage of M-4 missiles. 
Whatever the U.S. does, the British and the French could still keep their 
independent deterrents. There is less of a chance that the French will 
back out of a cooperative effort since their geographical proximity means 
that both nations are "strategically locked together." (38). The problem 
with this independence is that it could have a seriously detrimental 
effect on the nuclear relationship between Britain and the United States. 
The U.S. may even feel compelled to halt information exchanges with the 
British. The U.S. is NATO's nuclear superpower. Its nuclear technology 
is more advanced than that of France. Therefore, the British should 
think carefully before they damage the U.S./U.K* special relationship.
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Alford recommends trying the French option only if the U.S. were to end 
nuclear cooperation (39).
It is doubtful that the M-4 would have been substantially less 
expensive than the Trident D-5. Hobbs estimates the capital cost of the 
M-4 option at L6,000 million at 1983 prices (40). Trident D-5 costs were 
estimated at L6,984 million that year (41). The capital cost advantage 
of the M-4 would probably be offset somewhat by operational savings with 
D-5. Also, the D-5 is a much more capable system with more than twice 
the range of the M-4. In the end, the lesser abilities of the M-4 and 
the dramatically increased political costs do not make up for the 
financial savings it would offer.
Before ending discussion of the French option, it should be noted 
that the British and the French are considering joint submarine patrols 
to avoid wasting their minimal nuclear resources on duplicate targeting. 
Such useful cooperation would make the most of both small forces without 
disrupting Anglo-American relations (42).
Of all the ballistic missile options, Trident D-5 is clearly the 
most capable. While its procurement costs are the highest, potential 
savings over its lifetime resulting from commonality with the U.S. will 
probably offset the initial disadvantage. This will certainly be true if 
a missile improvement program becomes necessary. Trident's dependence on 
the U.S. for maintenance is a drawback, but such a situation is unlikely 
to emerge. If it dons, the long life of the D-5 missile provides enough 
time to make alternate arrangements. In the end, if the Polaris 
replacement is going to be a ballistic missile, the right choice is the
Trident D-5.
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Ballistic missiles are not the only option for a Polaris 
replacement. Many influential people have advocated cruise missiles as 
an effectivei inexpensive solution to the Polaris replacement problem.
For example, Dr. David Owen, former Labour Foreign Secretary and now 
leader of the Socia! Democratic Party, has always been an ardent 
supporter of cruise missiles (43), The merits and problems of this 
option will now be discussed.
The U.S. Tomahawk sea launched cruise missile has a range of about 
1,600 l Autical miles, and it must be fired within 500 miles of land to 
ensure accuracy. In comparison, Polaris submarines can fire a missile 
from up to 2,500 nautical miles away from its final target. Trident D-5 
missiles, with their 6,000 nautical mile range, provide their submarines 
with fifteen times more hiding space than the Tomahawk (44). However, 
oompared to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are more discrete and 
less likely to reveal the position of the submarine that launched them. 
The British could possibly fire a warning shot without having to worry as 
much that the launching submarine, and the rest of its missiles, would be 
found and destroyed (45).
Many have suggested equipping Britain's hunter-killer submarines 
with cruise missiles. The U.S. has already installed cruise missiles on 
its hunter-killers (46). If the British were to do the same, they would 
have to use vertical launchers since, unlike the American boats, launch 
tubes will not fit in between the inner and outer hull of British 
hunter-killers (47). Carrying missiles in torpedo rooms is feasible, but 
it takes away space needed for torpedoes.
There are some advantages to this basing mode. First, the IHD would
60
be spread among many more submarines than would be possible with a system 
strictly committed to the IND. Second, British ASW efforts would not be 
harmed by the disruption in the hunter-killer build rate caused by 
constructing submarines only for the IND. Third, at least some of the 
hunter-killers will normally operate within range of the Soviet Union 
anyway. Finally, it could cost as little as twenty-five to thirty 
percent of the Trident total (48).
There are also problems with hunter-killer baaing of cruise 
missiles. First, it is doubtful that the hunter-killers could carry 
enough missiles to provide for effective deterrence (49). Second, there 
is a conflict between the role of a missile submarine and that of a 
hunter-killer. A missile submarine must remain safely hidden from enomy 
shipping while a hunter-killer's job is to find and destroy that 
shipping. In a war, using hunter-killers for their intended mission 
would mean risking the IND (50). While the U.S. has put cruise missiles 
on some of its hunter-killer submarines, it still relies on committed 
ballistic missile submarines for the undersea leg of its strategic triad. 
Holding some hunter-killers back to save their missiles would cut the 
effective number of hunter-killers by as many boats as would a gap in the 
construction cycle to manufacture submarines specifically for the IND.
The submarines held in reserve could not carry as many missiles as could 
boats designed expressly for the IND. If cruise missiles are to be used, 
they should be based in submarines designated only for an IND atission*
The number of committed cruise missile submarines depends on how 
many warheads are desired. A British Trident submarine could carry up to 
eighty single warhead cruise missiles (51). The main question is how
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many of those missiles would reach their targets, and there is no 
consensus here* Cruise missiles are designed to avoid detection by 
flying close to the ground where their small size makes it hard for them 
to be distinguished from ground clutter by visual, radar, and infrared 
sensors. They can also vary the path to their targets to avoid known air 
defenses* Once a cruise missile is found, however, its slow speed makes 
it vulnerable to missiles and anti-aircraft fire (52). A supersonic 
cruise missile would spend less time reaching its target reducing the 
chances of it being found* Even if it were found, its high speed would 
make countermeasures more difficult. However, nobody has been able to 
develop a successful, supersonic cruise missile, and the development of 
one does not appear likely in the near future (53). Therefore, the 
debate comes down to whether or not subsonic cruise missiles will be able 
to avoid detection.
Ballistic missile defenses are limited by treaty while cruise 
missile defenses are not (54). The means to defeat cruise missiles are 
already in existence} advanced "Star Wars" technology is not needed.
Since the U.S. will deploy over nine thousand cruise missiles, the 
Soviets will definitely increase their anti-cruise efforts (55). In 
fact, the U.S. Department of Defense describes Soviet progress in its 
anti-cruise missile efforts as "significant." (56). While it must be 
noted that Soviet Military Power tends to give the Soviets the benefit of 
any doubts regarding their military capabilities, the essential point is 
that Soviet cruise missile defenses have improved over the years and will 
continue to do so. These developments would be especially worrying to 
the U.K. because, unlike the U.S., it cannot deploy enough cruise
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missiles to overload Soviet defenses.
On the other hand, there are factors working to improve the 
penetrability of cruise missiles. They are already hard to spot against 
background clutter even with look-down radar. The U.S. had trouble doing 
so about nine years ago with its most advanced look-down radar at the 
time (57). The Soviet Union has just started to introduce look-down 
radar and should experience similar difficulties (58). The Soviet job 
will be made even tougher if new Stealth technology is used. It has been 
estimated that the effective radar reflecting surface of the missile can 
be reduced to the size of a cricket ball (59). Chances of penetration 
would also be helped in a conflict where Soviet defenses have already 
been thinned or when they are not in the right positions to stop cruise 
missiles due to commitments to other operations. When all of these 
factors have been taken into consideration, it is probably safe to assume 
that, were Britain to act on its own, half of the missiles would reach 
their targets (60).
Cruise missiles could be either highly dependent on or independent 
of the United States. If the U.K. is able to buy U.S. missiles, there 
are still questions as to whether the U.S. would sell Britain its most 
advanced guidance and Stealth technologies (61). Cruise missiles are 
guided by an inertial system augmented by matching the terrain over which 
the missiles are flying with an internal map. With this system, it can 
place its warhead within thirty meters of the intended target (62). 
However, the internal map needs regular updating. Without fresh 
information, cruise missiles probably are not accurate enough to carry 
out even the British targeting policy. The U.K. does not have satellites
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which could provide the necessary maps. The British would have to rely 
on the U.S. for new information. This would give the U.S. more control 
over the British deterrent than would be possible with a ballistic 
missile system. Trident D-5's age more slowly than cruise missile 
guidance maps.
An independent British project to build its own missile and support 
systems, including mapping satellites, would not bo impossible, but it 
would be very expensive (63). Owen raises the prospect of collaboration 
between the British and other European nations (64). Such an effort 
would spread the development costs over several nations, and the European 
missiles would be capable of both nuclear and conventional missions so 
that many nations could use them. The end result would be total 
independence from the United States.
The cost of a cruise missile deterrent varies with the amount of 
capability desired. Younger estimates that it would take four hundred 
cruise missiles at sea at all times to yield a deterrence value 
equivalent to Trident (65). At eighty missiles per submarine, it would 
tako five submarines to house four hundred cruise missiles. To maintain 
five boats on patrol at all times requires eight in the operating cycle. 
Taking refits into consideration adds three more submarines for a total 
of eleven. It would take eight hundred missiles, allowing for 
twenty-five percent of the missiles in maintenance at any given time, to 
arm the eight boats in the operating cycle. While Younger does not give 
any numbers, it is clear that such a system would cost far more than 
Trident to build and operate. It would also put a serious strain on
manpower.
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Some of Younger’s figures are questionable, however. Assuming that 
half of the cruise missiles launched would get through, it would take 
only around throe cruise missile submarines to deliver the same number of 
warheads as a single Trident boat armed with 128 warheads (66). Even 
with these reduced numbers, Trident’s ability could not be matched less 
expensively with cruise missiles. However, it is not necessary to match 
Trident. With five submarines, two could be on station at all times for 
a total of 160 cruise missiles (67). Assuming that half the missiles 
reach their targets, the two submarines could destroy five times as many 
targets as a single Polaris boat. It would not bn advisable to provide 
for any fewer than five submarines. The range of a cruise missile is so 
short that the cruise missile submarines would have to operate in 
dangorous waters. It would not make sense to have only one boat on 
patrol under these conditions. Using the figures Hobbs presents, a five 
submarine force with eighty missiles per boat would cost from L3,750 
million to L4,000 million at 1983 prices (68). Once again, the capital 
cost of the Trident II program was placed at L6,984 million in 1983.
Operating expenses are harder to estimate. It will cost more to 
operate five boats rather than four. Another variable is improvements in 
Soviet defenses. With Trident, new warheads could be added to the 
missile in an attempt to stretch Soviet ABM defenses enough to get some 
warheads through. With cruise missiles, more missiles, and possibly more 
submarines, would be needed, an expensive proposition (69). Cruise 
missile technology is advancing rapidly. British forces would fall 
behind the times faster if they wore armed with cruise rather than with 
ballistic missiles. It can bo asked whether Britain could afford
frequent upgrades or even whether the U.S. would be willing to sell the 
U.K. its most advanced cruise missile technology (70). Trident, however, 
might also require an expensive mid-life improvement program. It is very 
difficult to tell whether Trident or submarine launched cruise missiles 
would eventually be more expensive, but the capital costs of the cruise 
option are low enough to provide a considerable margin for error.
The final question is whether the definite extra capital cost and 
the probable extra total cost of Trident is justified by its advantages 
in capability over a minimum cruise missile force. It is a question that 
is almost impossible to answer objectively. In my opinion, Trident is 
worth it. The IND is an important component of the British military. It 
would become even more important if the U.S. nuclear guarantee of Europe 
over became suspect. The British plan to operate only one system. That 
system must therefore have proven reliability and effectiveness. 
Experiments with new systems should be left to the superpowers that have 
enough backups to negate a failure. It is interesting that both of them 
rely on ballistic, not cruise, missiles to form the main part of their 
strategic deterrents. Britain needs a total replacement to the IND 
merely once every twenty-five to thirty years. The total cost of a 
cruise missile force is unlikely to be very much lower than the total 
cost of Trident. If the IND is to be accepted in principle, then the 
best choice for a replacement system is Trident II.
CHAPTER FIVE
ARMS CONTRuL, PUBLIC OPINION, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Chapter One looked into the past of the IND, and Chapters Two
through Four examined the options for the present. This chapter is
devoted to the future. More specifically, it will examine the likely
impact of arms control and British politics, both at the popular and at
the party level, on the future of the IND.
The arms control philosophy of the Conservative Government can be
summarized in a 1932 quote from Winston Churchill.
The cause of disarmament will not be obtained by Mush, Slush, and 
Gush. It will be advanced steadily by the harassing expense of 
fleets and armies, and by the growth in confidence in a long peace. (1).
In other words, the Conservatives endorse ’consistent and firm" Western
policy. The success of the "dual track" approach of simultaneous arms
control negotiations and weapons deployment used in the Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Talks is taken to be a vindication of the
merits of this policy (2). It is held in contrast to the failure of
unilateral moves on chemical weapons. The British renounced chemical
weapons in the late 1950’s, and the U.S. halted production of them in
1969. Despite these gestures, the Soviet Union continued to increase its
stockpiles (3). Only recently has there been any progress in this field.
Given the military might of the Soviet Union, the U.K. is understandably
.autions In its approach to arms control.
This attitude is clearest in the area of nuclear arms control. The
INF Agreement is a good example. Britain officially supports this treaty
and will allow Soviet inspections at the two U.S. cruise missile bases at
Greenham Common and Molesworth (4). The official rhetoric, however,
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hides a considerable amount of anxiety.
Ever since the Soviet Union gained the ability to directly threaten 
the U.S. with nuclear weapons, many in Europe have been concerned about 
the U.S. nuclear guarantee of NATO. They are worried that the U.S. would 
not be willing to use its nuclear weapons in defense of Western Europe 
due to fear of a devastating Soviet retaliation. This fear is 
particularly strong in European conservative parties. In fact, they even 
campaigned for deployment of U.S. INF forces in the early 1980's. The 
belief was that the U.S. would he more willing to use nuclear weapons to 
defend Europe if those weapons were based in Europe, if only to avoid 
losing the missiles to advancing Soviet forces. U.S. INF deployments 
were thought to help tie, or "couple," the U.S. to the nuclear defense of 
NATO. The loss of the INF weapons could reduce this "coupling." The 
elimination of INF forces also weakens the arguments of people like Prime 
Minister Thatcher that nuclear weapons are necessary to the defense of 
Europe. Many European governments used the chance of a "zero option" of 
no INF missiles in Europe to satisfy public demands for arms control.
They actually wanted a more limited treaty which would keep U.S. INF 
weapons, and the "coupling" they provided, in Europe, albeit at lower 
levels (5).
The British, with the support of most of the rest of NATO, even 
proposed that nuclear weapons with a range of under five hundred 
kilometers be excluded from the INF talks citing their deterrent value 
and the difficulty of verifying their removal (6). In fact, the British 
are currently examining the options for modernizing their free-fall 
nuclear bombs with a stand-off, air launched tactical missile (7). The
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actions of Prime Minister Thatcher's Government are in line with her 
statement that "A nuclear-free Europe, I do not believe, would be a 
war-free E u r o p e (8).
Britain shares the NATO goals of cutting the strategic arsenals of 
the superpowers in half, eliminating chemical weapons worldwide, and 
stabilizing the European conventional balance of power by eliminating 
numerical disparities. The British have proposed that further nuclear 
reductions in the European theater be delayed until those three goals are 
accomplished (9).
From the above framework, it can be seen that the Conservative 
Government, while not against arms control, is cautious in its dealings 
with the Soviet Union. It is also committed to nuclear deterrence as 
long as the numerical superiority of WTO conventional weapons remains. 
That commitment to nuclear deterrence extends to the IND. In 1983, the 
Government resisted the inclusion of its Polaris missiles in the INF 
talks (10). General Secretary Gorbachev resolved this issue at the 
Reykjavik Summit by saying of the British and French deterrents, "let 
them increase...and be further improved." (11). The IND is not included 
in any of the current negotiations and, should the Conservatives remain 
in power, will not be put on the table for a while. If Gorbachev's 
actions are in accordance with the words of his statement, then even 
Trident should not affect ongoing negotiations. The Conservative policy 
is to wait for cuts in the superpower arsenals beyond the proposed fifty 
percent. If these reductions were to occur and there were no substantial 
improvements in Soviet defenses, then the U.K. would consider what 
contributions it could make (12).
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Trident offers some flexibility for arms control. The number of 
warheads per missile could be reduced allowing Britain to retain an 
effective IND but at a lower level. Trident is also a large, single 
purpose system. These characteristics reduce the verification problems 
that are possible with small) easily concealed) dual purpose cruise 
missiles.
The small size of the IND, even after the introduction of Trident, 
leaves it vulnerable to improvements in ABM defenses. While a total 
shield against a superpower attack may prove impossible, technological 
advances could provide a system that would be able to stop a smaller 
nuclear strike* Given the Conservatives' commitment to nuclear 
deterrence in the face of WTO quantitative, conventional superiorities, 
they are understandably nervous about the American Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) and anxious to preserve the ABM Treaty (13). A worst 
case scenario for Western Europe would be an effective shield which could 
protect the superpowers from each other making nuclear deterrence 
impossible (14).
The official Government policy cautiously supports SDI 
subject to conditions agreed on by Prime Minister Thatcher and President 
Reagan in 1984 and 1986. SDI research allowed under the ABM Treaty 
should continue, but deployment would have to be a matter for 
negotiation. The overall goal is to maintain balance with the Soviets 
and to enhance deterrence. Negotiations should aim for security by 
reducing offensive systems on both sides, and there should be close 
consultation among the members of NATO on the above points (15). 
Essentially, these points are designed to maintain nuclear deterrence,
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reduce numerical disparities, and hopefully avoid any surprises from the 
United States*
The Conservatives are determined to protect the IND, and their 
policies are designed to do so* However, there is no guarantee that they 
will retain their majority in Parliament forever. The future of the IND 
could change dramatically if another p-;rty were to gain control of the 
House of Commons. Throughout the history of the IND, the major decisions 
have been made at the highest levels of government, often times secretly 
among a few select cabinet members. However, it was the people who 
elected those Governments, and it is unlikely that a future Government 
will continue with the IND if the British people strongly object to it. 
Therefore, any look at the political future of the IND must start with an 
examination of public opinion.
The majority of the British people favor a strong defense*
Fifty-two percent believe that a country that reduces its defenses is 
more likely to be attacked because it cannot defend itself (16). 
Eighty-eight percent believe that treaties with the Soviet Union should 
contain reliable verification measures (17), and 76% feel that declaring 
an area a "nuclear free zone" has no effect on the chances of that area 
being targeted (18).
Support for the IND is also strong. Lewis has been commissioning 
Gallup polls since 1985 asking, "Do you think Britain should or should 
not continue to possess nuclear weapons as long as the Soviet Union has 
them?" Support for the IND has never dipped below 66% (19). The 
statistical breakdown on the most recent poll, March, 1988, reveals that 
oupport for the IND never goes below 64% in any gender, age, or class
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group (20). Splitting the data by party, probably a more politic, ly 
relevant breakdown, shows that 87% of the Conservatives, 69% of the 
supporters of the center parties, and even 53% of Labour voters back the 
XND (21). A more recent MORI poll of trade unionists reveals 60% support 
the IND. Only when the results were restricted to Labour trade unionists 
does the support for the IND drop to 46% (22). It is interesting that a 
substantial percentage of Labour voters do not support their party's 
policy of unilateral disarmament.
Trident is less popular than the IND, however. After eight years it 
has yet to get the support of a majority of the people even though more 
people support it than oppose it. In his poll, Lewis also asked whether 
the Trident program should be completed. Forty-six percent said "yes" 
compared to 37% who said "no" and 18% "don't know." The "yes" responses 
are up from 43% in 1987 while the "no" responses held steady (23). It 
seems that support for Trident is slowly growing as the program nears 
completion, but that support does not appear to be deep. The breakdown 
of the results reveals that more men, people over twenty-four, and people 
above the lower two classes support Trident than oppose it (24).
The party statistics show 64% of Conservatives, around 49% of the 
supporters of the center parties, but only 26% of Labour voters behind 
Trident (25). The Labour support for Trident is less than half of its 
support for the IND in general. Labour supporters possibly like the idea 
of an IND but are at a loss to pick a successor to Polaris. This would 
mean that support for Trident; will approach support for the IND as the 
system becomes operational and fades into the background. On the other 
hand, the lack of support for Trident could be genuinely based on dislike
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of the system itself. In this ease, it would be easier for a Labour 
Government to cancel Trident. The former is probably closer to the 
truth.
Another, more politically relevant illustration of support for the 
IND is the 1987 general election. The Conservative Manifesto proclaimed 
support for Trident and the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on British 
soil, It accused the other two major parties of desiring unilateral 
nuclear disarmament (26), This charge is not entirely true. The 
Alliance of the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties renounced Trident 
but supported an unspecified modernization of the IND until it could be 
negotiated away as part of a global arms control process. The Alliance 
accepted the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on British soil subject to 
a British veto over their use (27). Part of the reason for the Alliance 
hedging was that the Liberals tended to be more anti-nuclear than their 
SDP partners (28). The Alliance Manifesto represented a compromise 
position. Labour promised to cancel Trident, decommission Polaris, and 
ask the U.S. to remove its nuclear weapons from British soil (29). In 
fact, Labour leader Neil Kinnock declared that he would recall all of the 
Polaris submarines within two weeks of a Labour victory (30).
The Conservatives were able to use defense issues to their 
advantage. Labour leaders knew from the start that defense was the 
weakest part of their program. They were not helped when General Bernard 
Rogers, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, predicted that the 
implementation of Labour's policies would cause the U.S. public to call 
for the return of U.S. troops (31). The Conservatives used defense as 
their major weapon against Labour and were able to increase the number of
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people rating it ns a major issue by 13% during the campaign (32). A 
poll released on Hay 31 showed the Conservatives were trusted most on 
defense by 51% of the voters compared to 23% for Labour and only 13% for 
the Alliance. On the other hand, only 16% of the voters listed defense 
among the two main reasons that they did not plan to vote Conservative 
compared to 45% for Labour. Issues other than defense hurt the Alliance 
most. The efficacy of the Conservative tactics on defense is shown by 
the fact that Labours* negative rating on defense was only 35% on May 17 
(33). It seems clear that Labour's anti-nuclear position cost it votes.
Whether or not the Conservatives can use the defense issue as 
effectively in the next election is debatable. Many Conservatives were 
worried that, without Labour's weakness on defense, the election would 
have been much closer (34). The public support for the IND will probably 
remain. If tensions in the world continue to decline, however, other 
is sues may become more important than keeping the IND, It is ironic that 
the Conservatives could eventually be hurt by the progress in East-West 
relations that their policies helped to bring about. A public feeling 
more secure might be willing to ignore Labour's unilateral disarmament 
policies in order to support the party on the "caring" issues where 
Labour has an edge over the Conservatives. In fact, "not caring" was the 
Conservatives' biggest negative. Among the voters who did not vote 
Conservative, 60% listed "not caring" as one of the top two reasons for 
not supporting the party (35).
The Conservative position would be improvod if the public were 
knowledgeable about defense issues. Unfortunately this is not the case. 
Returning to the survey of Rose and Blaker* only q0% realized that the
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WTO outnumbers NATO in conventional arms (36). Only 4% realized that the 
IND costs Britain less than 5% of its defense budget (37). The 
percentage of those saying "don1!, know" was high for all of the factual 
questions. Despite this ignorance, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were 
virtually tied, with very few "don't knows," when it was asked which one 
posed the greater threat to Europe (38). It is interesting to note that 
the people who knew the least about the real balance of power were the 
most likely to say that the U.S. posed the biggest threat (39). It may 
seem strange that so many people support the IND despite being uninformed 
on the details of defense and disarmament. Blaker explains this 
discrepancy by theorizing that, while people are not interested in the 
details, they generally realize that the Soviets are threatening and that 
strength deters aggression (40). In other words, the attitudes of the 
British public towards defense are based more on feelings than on facts.
This lack of factual knowledge does leave the British public open to 
propaganda appeals from the Soviet Union. I t  would definitely be in the 
interests of the Soviet Union to eliminate the British and the French 
deterrents. First, Soviet military calculations would be made easier by 
the elimination of these two "second decision making centers." Second, 
the U.K. is seen as an important i n f l u e n c e  on the U.S., especially in 
helping to maintain the U.S. nvuucar guarantee of Europe (41). If the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union are able to negotiate arms reductions in the 
next few years, Britain's Trident modernization, which would increase the 
number of British warheads, cou ld  make Mrs. Thatcher appear to be "the 
odd woman out." (42). The Soviets have already tried to pin that image 
on her. After the Prime Minister visited Moscow in 1987, one Soviet
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commentator contrasted Thatcher’s position on nuclear with the
position in favor of total nuclear disarmament almost taken by President 
Reagan at the Reykjavik Summit. Prime Minister Thatcher was diagnosed as 
having "nucleophilia." (A3). As arms control prcgresses, it would be 
wise for the Conservatives to make their position on the subject clear 
and to provide easy to understand answers to the public’s questions (44).
As stated above, barring a dramatic arms control breakthrough or a 
nuclear accident, public support for the IND is likely to remain strong. 
It has lasted for decades and will probably not fade away quickly. 
Conservative strength on this issue may increase a load in an easy 
election and could push the party over the top in a close one. It would 
not be enough to offset, for example, a serious downturn in the economy. 
While the people select the ptrty which will form a Government, it is 
eventually that Government which must decide the future of the IND making 
it necessary to examine the positions of the various parties on the 
subject.
The next election is several years away. Party policies could 
change by then, but the party conferences last fall provide the most 
recent indicator of where the parties are heading. The news reports 
about the Conservative conference in Brighton did not mention any changes 
in defense policy. The conference itself basically endorsed Conservative 
policies across the board leading The Economist to claim that the only 
objections to motions came from those who did not believe that the 
motions praised the Government enough (45).
During the last election, the centrist Alliance of the Social 
Democratic Party and the Liberal Party preached the value of unity.
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After the election, the Alliance broke up. There was some discussion of 
defense at the SDP conference in Torquay. Dr. David Owen's party, freed 
from the political constraints of the Alliance, came out in favor of not 
only the IND but also Trident (46). Dr. Owen had preferred a cruise 
missile based IND. The switch probably comes less from support of 
Trident and more from the fact that the project is too far along to 
permit any major alterations. The defense policy of the new Social and 
Liberal Democrats (essentially the old Liberal Party) is much less clear. 
At their Blackpool conference, the big issue was the name of the party 
rather than defense (47). The leader, Paddy Ashdown, has a record of 
supporting unilateral nuclear disarmament, but there is no consensus 
among the rest of the party members (48). The views of these two parties 
will probably not be that important since combined they only have twelve 
percent of the vote, down from the twenty-three percent the Alliance 
received in the 1987 election (49).
The big question is the Labour Party. It is the only opposition 
party that has the potential to defeat the Conservatives and institute an 
alternative defense policy. For a long time there was little difference 
between the Conservatives and Labour on defense. Labour Governments 
decided to build the bomb, continue Polaris, and continue Chevaline. It 
was not until the early 1980's that the unilateral disarmers in the party 
were able to put their ideas in the platform under the leadership of 
Michael Foot. That policy has cost Labour votes in the past two general 
elections, and some of the party leaders have considered softening 
Labour's unilateralism to make it more acceptable to the voters. Over 
the past summer, Labour leader Neil Kinnock caused an uproar when he
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suggested that Britain could negotiate a "something for something" 
disarmament deal with the Soviet Union rather than giving up the IHD in a 
"something for nothing" move. Kinnock*s proposal even cost him his 
defense spokesman Denzil Davies, who resigned accusing Kinnock of 
changing Labour defense policy almost daily (50).
Despite being reelected to the post of party leader by a large 
majority at the party conference at Blackpool, Kinnock lost a major vote 
on defense policy. The Labour leadership sponsored a motion calling for 
the elimination of nuclear weapons "by steps of unilateral, bilateral, 
and multilateral disarmament." The motion was defeated by a majority of
335,000 (51). Important in that defeat was the block vote of 1.25 
million against the motion by the Transport and General Workers Union 
leader Ron Todd (52). The conference did approve by a 1,244,000 majority 
a motion calling for Britain to unilaterally remove all nuclear weapons 
and bases from its soil within a year of gaining power. Another motion 
advocating the transfer of savings from nuclear disarmament to social 
programs was carried by a 480,000 vote majority (53). That vote directly 
contradicts a pledge in Labour*s last Manifesto to use the money saved 
from nuclear disarmament to upgrade conventional forces (54). It leads 
to questions as to whether an IND cancelled under a Labour Government 
would really lead to a greater investment in conventional weapons.
The vote on defense at this past conference was not final. Formal 
Labour defense policy will not be settled till next year. Kinnock has 
warned that Labour will find it difficult to win if it is not trusted on 
defense issues. He and other Labour leaders hope that a more moderate 
defense policy can be approved by the party at that time (55).
CONCLUSION
Britain has been involved with nuclear weapons from the start of the 
nuclear era. During this tine, the U.K. has gone from a pioneer nation 
to one which is dependent on another country for the weapons of its 
deterrent. The debate over Trident has raised many questions including 
whether or not there should be an IND at all. Unfortunately, there are 
no clear, unproblematic answers to those questions, and I have tried to 
convey their inherent complexity. However, despite the difficulties, the 
issues surrounding the IND cannot be ignored; decisions eventually must 
be made. The following paragraph contains the conclusions that I have 
reached after examining the issues related to the British IND.
The IND makes a contribution to deterrence, and it should be kept 
and modernized. However, it must be realized that the expense of nuclear 
weapons systems makes Britain dependent on the U.S. in the long run even 
if the U.S. cannot prevent Britain from using the weapons it has. The 
Thatcher Government chose correctly when it selected Trident II. It has 
more capability than Britain really needs, but the other systems, for 
various reasons, do not satisfy the requirements of a minimum deterrent 
as well as Trident II does. The IND will not harm current or planned 
arms control negotiations although it will eventually have to be put on 
the table. Public support for the IND remains strong as demonstrated by 
polls and election returns. However, the strength of the Conservatives 
on defense probably would not be enough to sustain their Parliamentary 
majority should they be damaged by other electoral factors. Finally, the 
existence of the IND is threatened by the unilateral disarmament policies 
of Labour. Whether or not Labour acts on those policies or follows the
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lead of past Labour Governments in maintaining the IND is unknown* In 
any case, it can only be hoped that the British act thoughtfully and that 
their actions, whatever they may be, make a contribution to the goals of 
a free Britain and a secure world peace.
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